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CHAPTER I 
Introduction 
The nuances of wage determination in the construction industry are 
poorly understood. The consequence of the failure to understand fully 
the wage determination process in construction is probably a reduced 
ability to control inflation throughout the economy. Construction wage 
increases may contribute to price increases elsewhere in the economy 
through increasing the cost of capital put in place, and hence prices, 
through setting patterns which affect the wage increases other workers 
receive, or both. 
The most obvious opportunity for government to interyene in this 
process and thereby affect inflation is during periods of formal wage 
control. By government procurement policy, manpower training programs, 
labor relations involvement, targeted tax incentives, etc., government 
may and, in fact, does intervene in this process at all times. We do 
not, however, know whether existing government intervention is optimally 
designed as an anti-inflation tool since we do not understand the dy-
namics of construction wage determination well. 
The research reported here represents an attempt to better under-
stand wage adjustments in this industry.. Our models examine both wage 
setting in the unionized sector and the interaction between wages in 
that sector and the unorganized sector. Our work spans the decade of 
the 1970's. This allows us to examine wage setting in both free and 
controlled markets. 
We have been careful in model development to include both market 
and institutional variables. We do this because there are two principal 
theories, complementary in many respects, which are alleged to explain 
. . 
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wage determination phenomena in general and the construction wage deter-
mination process in particular. The first is known as the "marginalist" 
approach or theory. Labor's wages are treated by this approach as any 
factor payment would be. The other theory, associated with the work of 
John Dunlop (1957) and others, is known as the contour theory. Contour 
theory basically argues that a given wage increase in one "key" wage 
determining unit will be closely mimicked in those wage determining 
units which are associated with the key unit, i.e., that are members of 
its contour. Wages in the key unit are held to be determined as tradi-
tiona! marginalist theory suggests. In Chapter II we present a review 
of the 1970's research literature which addresses wage determination in 
construction, and this debate in particular. 
Cross sectional models of wage change in the unionized sector of 
the building industry are presented in Chapter III. Three time periods, 
1972-73, 1973-74, and 1976-77, are included. In addition to three ag-
gregate models we estimate models for each of 14 crafts. Those crafts 
are bricklayers, cement masons, carpenters, electricians, iron workers, 
laborers, plasterers, crane operators, painters, pipefitters, plumbers, 
roofers, sheet metal workers, and teamsters. 
The relationship between craft-union and nonunion wages is explored 
in Chapter IV. The nonunion wage, total employment, and union employ-
ment data are derived from the 1972, 1973, 1976, and 1977 Industry Wage 
Surveys of construction. Once again, only cross sectional models are 
estimated. 
No time series models are estimated here. We had hoped to estimate 
such models but data limitations prevented us from so doing. While 20 
years of data were available on negotiated construction wages, only nine 
r 
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years of data (1972-80) were available on our key demand variable, total 
volume of construction activity. We considered creating a synthetic 
demand variable from available housing starts data but rejected this. 
Any failure to exactly replicate the missing volume data would cause a 
false indication of significance on the wage control variable where the 
data was spliced together. We could not have known whether our replica-
tion wa$ completely successful so we abandoned the time series approach. 
When this work is combined with the 1974 Construction Industry Stabili-
zation Committee-funded work of Shulenburger, however, intensive cross 
sectional studies covering the entire 1960-1979 time period exist. 
Chapter V comments upon the research presented here. Our finding 
" regarding the demand and supply variables raises some interesting issues 
about the nature of construction industry wage determination. The value 
of the newly available data used here in understanding the construction 
wage setting process is also discussed there. Finally, the findings re-
lating to. effects of wage control reported there are apt to be contro-
versial. 
Introduction 
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CHAPTER II 
Construction Industry Wage Determination 
Research in the 1970's 
The process of wage determination in the construction industry is 
a highly complex one which does not always conform to the dictates of 
orthodox microeconomic theory. A post-World War II history of construe-
tion wages reveals a highly expansionary period during the 1950's and 
1960's, followed by a control period in the early 1970's during which 
wage increases were moderated. With the removal of controls the wage 
explosion, predicted by some, was moderated by an economic recession and 
1 the increasing influence of open shop construction. 
Recent research into the problem of wage determination in construe-
tion has concentrated on two theories. The first is the marginalist 
theory or market comparison theory which represents standard microec-
nomic theory. The second is the wage contour theory or hypothesis, orig-
inally proposed by John Dunlop. 
Marginalist theory holds that wages in construction are determined 
by the demand for and supply of construction labor; there may also be 
demographic and institutional variables affecting the wage determina-
tion process, such as population, union power, local consumer price in-
dex, and so forth. 
A wage contour consists of one or more keys or leaders who estab-
lish the standard of wage gains and the remaining nonkeys or members of 
the contour, who attempt to follow the gains established by the key(s). 
Nonkeys may be associated with certain keys through proximity, through 
similarity of work tasks, or through long established interrelationships 
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among the crafts. The wage changes of keys are determined by demand for 
.. and supply of construction labor plus other demographic and institutional 
variables. The wage changes of nonkeys are affected by the demographic 
it is hypothesized that the major influence on nonkey wages is the wage 
.I 
and institutional variables that affect the wages of the keys; however, 
change negotiated by the key. 
Current Research in Wage Determination in Construction 
During the last decade several researchers have attempted to test 
these two theories of wage determination. D. Q. Mills has p~blished two 
studies dealing with wage determination by the marginalist approach. 
D. E. Shulenburger has published two studies examining whe!her wages of 
keys are structured primarily by market forces, and whether wages of non-
keys are structured primarily by wages of keys with some influence from 
other institutional variables. Ross, in an unpublished Ph.D. disserta-
tion, tested a marginalist model, and attempted to determine influences 
among the crafts which could have represented wage interdependencies. 
Stephen Welch takes a slightly different marginalist approach by analyz-
ing the effects of substitution of nonunion for union labor on the 
union-nonunion wage ratio. 
Mills (1971) includes the following variables in his marginalist 
model. The dependent variable is annual percentage change in contract 
construction wages. The. independent variables include percentage change 
in local contract construction employment, percentage change in local 
unemployment rate, and dummy variables representing incidence of strikes~ 
upper midwestern region, number of employees covered by the agreement, 
cities included in the BLS survey of union wages and hours in the build-
ing ·trades, basic construction trades, and mechanical specialty trades. 
[' 
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These variables represent two supply variables, two union power or insti-
tutional variables and four demographic variables. Of the demographic 
variables, the midwest region and the .inclusion in the BLS survey could 
proxy for demand for construction labor. At the time of this early 
study there was a definite lack of data measuring construction demand, 
hence, Mills' heavy reliance on indicator variables to measure demand. 
One would not expect the explanatory power of these variables to be very 
adequate and would normally like to avoid using them, especially for 
variables of major importance. 
Mills' findings suggest that larger wage increases result when an 
area experiences a large increase in contract construction employment, 
when the civilian worker unemployment rate declines significantly, when 
a strike has occurred, when the relevant crafts are mechanical, and when 
the craft bargaining unit is relatively large. Because the data, which 
covered the period 1950-67, are not craft specific it is impossible for 
Mills to observe any patterns among the various craft wages. 
The second study by Mills (1974), initially intended as a replica-
tion of the first study with a data ~et expanded to include the years 
1967-1972, resulted in a much poorer model. Mills determined that two 
additional variables were needed in order to account for the changing 
trends in wage structure among the crafts and for the wage control pe-
riod of the early 1970's. Wage structure in construction was measured 
by the variance of the percentage change in union wages and fringe bene-
fits for 22 crafts in 52 cities over the preceding three-year periods. 
A time series model was tested including as independent variables annual 
percentage change in average hourly earnings in nonagricultural indus-
tries, change in the construction unemployment rate, lagged one year, 
, 
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variance of inter-trade wage and fringe benefit packages, and a dummy 
for the CISC wage control period. Clearly the first three variables are 
supply variables while the last is an institutional variable. 
All the variables had highly significant coefficients. However, 
because a time series model was used, the number of degrees of freedom 
was very small. Thus, one would hesitate to make statements about wage 
determination in general on the basis of the results in Mills' second 
study. 
The Shulenburger studies (1974, 1978) actually test both theories 
in .that he first uses cluster analysis to attempt to identify keys and 
nonkeys and then regression analysis to test the validity of the classi-
fications. He hypothesizes that the key wage determination process will 
be closer to the market determinations than the nonkey wage determina-
tion process and therefore, that the explained variance for keys should 
be greater than the explained variance for nonkeys in a standard regres-
sion model. 
Shulenburger's dependent variable is the time-weighted average an-
nual negotiated wage change expressed in cents-per-hour for a specific 
_local during one wage round. Wage rounds are determined through factor 
analysis. His independent variables include percentage change in the 
SMSA's contract construction employment, a ratio of housing starts in 
the SMSA to contract construction employment in the SMSA, the inverse of 
the civilian unemployment rate by SMSA, the change in membership for the 
craft local in the SMSA, the percent of construction workers in the SMSA 
who are unionized, the percentage change in unionized craft workers, the 
percent of contract negotiations with strike activity, the absolute de-
viation of wage ranking of locals in the SMSA from their rank in 1960, 
8 
the change in consumer price index, and the population of the SMSA. The 
change in contract construction employment and the index of housing 
starts represent demand variables; the unemployment rate and the index 
of union membership represent supply variables; and the percent and per-
centage change of unionized construction workers in the SMSA, strike ac-
tivity, and wage ranking variables are market power variables, with con-
sumer price index and population being demographic variables. 
Shulenburger's results indicate support for the idea that variance 
in the key wage is explained better by supply and demand variables than 
variance in the nonkey wage. The nonkey wage variance shows the influ-
ence of key wage rates, particularly for the plasterers. Because there 
was no consistent pattern across crafts or time periods, no generaliza-
tions about contour behavior were made. The use of cluster analysis to 
identify the key bargaining units introduces some arbitrariness into the 
determination; however, the methodology is an improvement on previously 
performed heuristic methods of key identification. 
In his dissertation Ross (1976) attempts to find directional rela-
tionships among construction crafts through regression analysis and 
classification of the resulting coefficients. Ross' dependent variable 
is percentage change in wages of the specific craft, and his independent 
variables are unemployment rates, consumer price index, a strike dummy, 
and the marginal revenue product of construction labor in the basic 
models and later, additions of lagged values of percentage wage changes 
by crafts and cities. Given certain values of the relevant coefficients 
he then attempts to set up flow models of the influences among crafts. 
Ross finds · most support for his general model, one in which each 
craft is shown to have some influence on the wage determination processes 
9 
of all other crafts in the sample. A severe limitation of this study is 
the restriction of crafts to the electricians, iron workers, and plumbers. 
According to Mills (1980) in 1975 these three crafts were ranked first, 
second, and third by average wage and fringe benefits packages; Ross is 
forced to conclude that his general interdependence model most accurately 
describes the wage determination process, i.e., all crafts are influenc-
ing all other crafts' wage bargaining; thus, very little is learned 
about the possible differences between market forces and institutional 
forces on the wage determination process as a whole. Perhaps if he had 
chosen three crafts with more disparate rankings (such as plumbers, 
bricklayers and roofers) some effects of market forces or patterns of 
contour effects might have been revealed. 
Welch's study (1980) is undertaken from a slightly different mar-
ginalist perspective. His dependent variable is the log of the union-
nonunion wage ratio among six construction crafts. The independent 
variables are the proportion of unionized persons in each craft, this 
proportion squared, and dummy variables for crafts and cities. He finds 
that the two union membership proportions are highly significant and 
that, among crafts, sheet metal workers and laborers are significant 
and, among cities, Miami and Denver are significant. 
Welch concludes that the relationship between extent of trade union 
organization and union-nonunion wage differentials is nonlinear and that 
the wage ratio is at a maximum when the union proportion is approxi-
mately 66%. Unfortunately an attempt by Shulenburger et al. to repli-
cate the significance of these results with an expanded data set was un-
successful. This examination is reported in Chapter IV. It is unclear 
. . 
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why Welch limited himself to only six crafts when 19 more observations 
could be obtained by including four more crafts. 
Additional Independent Variables Discussed 
in the Current Research 
When constructing a marginalist model ; several kinds of independent 
variables are necessary. Obviously supply and demand variables need to 
be included and the more specific the data for these variables the bet-
ter explanatory power will be obtained from their inclusion. This sec-
tion investigates some additional variables that current researchers ar-
gue should be included in a complete model of wage determination in con-
struction. 
An important class of independent variables that has' been largely 
neglected in previous studies could be termed institutional variables, 
i.e., variables capturing the effects of government regulation, bargain-
ing structure trends and so forth. It would be desirable to include 
some institutional variables in the marginalist model which current 
researchers indicate may have a significant impact on the wage determi-
nation process. Major support can be found for the inclusion of vari-
ables dealing with the degree of unionization, the occurrence of strike 
activity at the time of bargaining, current trends in bargaining struc-
ture, the degree of labor market sharing between construction and other 
industries, and the effects of the Davis-Bacon Act • 
. First, it seems clear that the degree of unionization among crafts 
has a significant effect on the outcome of wage determination. A cur-
sory examination of nearly all relevant data will show that union wages 
are higher, almost without exception, than nonunion wages. Several 
studies have dealt with this issue ~ Soderstrom (1972) performed a 
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linear programming analysis of carpenters and determined the elasticity 
of demand for carpenters' labor. The traditional marginalist argument 
holds that the smaller the elasticity of demand, the smaller the adverse 
employment effect of any union-negotiated wage increase, thus, the more 
freedom the union would have to negotiate larger wage increases. Since 
the carpenters' elasticity of demand is relatively small, their union 
negotiators are relatively powerful in the wage bargaining process, and 
their wages are less subject to supply and demand generated fluctuations. 
Oaxaca (1975) finds that among craftsmen, regional differences in union 
wages are smaller than regional differences in nonunion wages. Thus, 
the pattern of higher union wages seems to prevail over the entire 
country. Welch (1980) finds that his variable representing proportion 
of unionization is highly significant although this result seems to be 
questionable given subsequent research. In light of these findings, a 
degree of unionization variable might be able to pick up certain insti-
tutional qualities that simple supply and demand variables would omit. 
A second influence which is directly related to union power and de-
gree of unionization is the occurrence of strikes during thebargaining 
process. Foster (1978) finds some evidence that strike activity leads 
to higher settlements and that there has been more strike activity in 
recent years. Lipsky and Farber (1976) find that there has been ' an in-
crease in the severity of economic strikes in the last 30 years in con-
struction. Mills (1971) also finds significance in his strike variable 
reported earlier. Another factor which, according to Mills, makes the 
strike by one construction craft particularly powerful is the interde-
pendence of the crafts in the construction process. A strike by one 
craft can ultimately result -in a work stoppage by one or more other 
12 
crafts, thus exerting even greater pressure on the employer to settle. 
Thus, there is support for the inclusion of a strike variable. 
A third influence on wage determination in construction involves 
changes in the bargaining structure of construction crafts. It has long 
been suggested by Dunlop and others that a more centralized bargaining 
structure would be beneficial in the construction industry. Two types 
of more centralized bargaining have emerged recently: wide-area bargain-
ing and multicraft bargaining. Hartman and Franke (1980) find that both 
of these types tend to limit the autonomy of the local and move effective 
union power to more intermediate levels. They indicate that one of the 
motives for more centralization is the reduction of strike activity. 
, 
Since strike activity has been proposed as a relevant institutional 
variable, coordinated bargaining efforts designed to reduce strike ac-
tivity should also be included as a determinant in the wage determina-
tion process. 
A fourth influence on construction wage determination is the effect 
on construction workers' wages of earnings from outside the construction 
industry. Bowlby (1980) is able to conclude that the largest proportion 
of earnings of construction workers from outside the construction in-
dustry comes from the manufacturing sector. This finding provides a 
sound argument for the inclusion of a form of the manufacturing wage 
rate as a relevant independent variable. Bowlby would like to charac-
. terize workers primarily engaged in construction as "regular" w0rkers 
and those who flow in and out of construction as "casual" workers. The 
data, however, do not support this conclusion. It seems that it would 
be more interesting to be able to make these characterizations in terms 
13 
of union and nonunion workers. However, it seems that the data do not 
permit this kind of analysis. 
Finally there is the question of the effects of the Davis-Bacon Act 
on local construction wages. The standard criticism of the Davis-Bacon 
. Act is that it increases the bargaining power of unions, and this in 
turn increases the relative wages in both sectors of construction. 
Goldfarb and Morrall (1981) are able to conclude that the Davis-Bacon 
Act is not economically efficient, but nevertheless, it may be justified 
on grounds of equity benefits to construction crafts as a whole. Thus, 
an indicator variable representing areas with coordinated bargaining 
should be included in the marginalist model. 
The study reported here does not deal specifically with skilled-
unskilled wage differentials in construction. However, particular at-
tention will be paid to results of craft-specific regressions for la-
borers and plumbers. Laborers traditionally have the lowest wages in 
the construction industry while the plumbers are ranked very highly (ac-
cording to Mills, in 1975 plumbers ranked first). As Gustman and Segal 
(1974) point out, the skill margin in construction has narrowed during 
the past 20 years and the causes of this narrowing are not only supply 
and demand factors but also contour factors, i.e., the desire of unions 
to negotiate settlements that maintain traditional equity relationships 
among construction crafts. Thus, the coefficients of the craft-specific 
regressions for laborers and plumbers will be of particular interest 
with regard to wage interdependencies. 
14 
Footnotes 
1 
Foster, H., "Industrial Relations in Construction: 1970-1977," 
Industrial Relations, Vol. 17, No. 1. 
15 
SOURCES FOR CHAPTER II 
Bowlby, Roger, L., "Industrial Mobility of Construction Workers: An An-
alysis of Continuous Work History Sample Data," in Annual Construc-
tion Industry Report, Office of Construction Industry Service, U.S. 
Department of Labor, April, 1980, pp. 37-71. 
Foster, Howard G., "Industrial Relations in Construction: 1970-1977," 
Industrial Relations, Vol. 17, No. 1 (February, 1978), pp. 1-17. 
-----, "Labor-Force Adjustments to Seasonal Fluctuations in Con-struction," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 23, No. 4 
(July, 1970), pp. 528-540. 
, "Wages in Construction: Examining the Arguments," Indus-
---~~ trial Relations, Vol. 11, No. 3 (October, 1972), pp. 336-349. 
Goldfarb, R. and J. Morrall, III, "The Davis-Bacon Act: An Appraisal of 
Recent Studies," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 34, 
No. 2 (January, 1981), pp. 191-206. 
Gustman, Alan and Martin Segal, "The Skilled-Unskilled Wage Differential 
in Construction," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 27, 
No. 2 (January, 1974), pp. 261-275. 
, "Wages, Wage Supplements, and the Interaction of Union Bar-
---~-gains in the Construction Industry," Industrial and Labor Relations 
Review, Vol. 25, No. 2 (January, 1972), pp. 179-185. 
Hartman, Paul T. and Walter H. Franke, "The Changing Bargaining Struc-
ture in Construction: Wide-Area and Multicraft Bargaining," Indus-
trial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 33, No. 2 (January, 1980), 
pp • . 170-184. 
Lipsky, David B. and Henry s. Farber, "The Composition of Strike Activity 
in the Construction Industry," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 
Vol. 29, No. 3 (April, 1976), pp. 388-404. 
Mills, D. Q., "Construction," in Collective Bargaining: Contemporary 
American Experience, G. Somers, ed., IRRA Series, 1980, pp. 49-97. 
-----' "Explaining Pay Increases in Construction: 1953-1972," In-
dustrial Relations, Vol. 13, No. 2 (May, 1974), pp. 196-201. --
-----' Industrial Relations and Manpower in Construction (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The MIT Press), 1972. 
, "Wage Determination in Contract Construction," Industrial Re-
----~ 
lations, Vol. 10, No. 1 (February, 1971), pp. 72-85. 
Oaxaca, Ronald L., "Estimation of Union/Nonunion Wage Differentials 
· within Occupational/Regional Subgroups," Jour-nal of Human Resources, 
Vol. X, No. 4 (Fall, 1975), pp. 529-536. 
... 
.. 
16 
Orton, Eliot s., "Changes in the Skill Differential: Union Wages in Con-
struction, 1907-1972," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 
30, No. 1 (October, 1976), pp. 16-24. 
Ross, C. G., Investigation of Unionized Contract Construction Wage 
Changes: A Micro Analysis 1960-1971, unpublished Ph.D. disserta-
. tion, Boston College, 1976. 
Shulenburger, David E., "A Contour Theoretic Approach to the Determina-
tion of Negotiated Wage Change in the Building Construction Indus-
try," Economic Inquiry, Vol. XVI,No. 3 (July, 1978), pp. 395-410. 
----~~--· The Determination of Negotiated Wage Change in the Building 
Construction Industry, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University 
of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1974. 
, "~rior Identification of 'Key' Wage Determining Units," In-
----~d-us_t_r-ial Relations, Vol. 16, No. 1 (February, 1977), pp. 71-82.---
, "Wage Leadership and Patterns of Wage Settlement in Construc-
------t~io-n--,.,. Proceedings of the 30th Annual Winter Meeting, IRRA Series, 
1977, pp. 185-192. 
Soderstrom, Lee, "Wage and the Employment of Carpenters," Industrial Re-
lations, Vol. 11, No. 3 (October, 1972), pp. 325-335 • 
Welch, Stephen, "Union-Nonunion Construction Wage Differentials," Indus-
trial Relations, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Spring, 1980), pp. 152-162 • 
I 
17 
CHAPTER III 
Wage Determination in the Organized Sector 
Empirical Specification 
The authors' intentions were (a) to develop models of wage determi-
nation ~n the unionized segment of the construction industry, incorporat-
ing aspects of both the marginalist and the contour-theoretic wage theo-
ries, and (b) to compare the estimates of the model for .the period of 
economic controls (1971-1974) to estimates for the post-control period. 
1 Our procedure was a variant of Lewis's Variant B-I. The relative wage 
effect of unionism itself was subsumed in the constant term (there being 
no nonunion wages in the data set) and the contributions af economic, 
bargaining structure, and wage-leadership variabtes were indicated by 
their estimated coefficients. Our emphasis on economic variables iri 
wage determination is in the tradition of the ~1arshall-Hicks analysis 
2 of union bargaining power. 
Of the possible sources of economic power, we were limited in our 
specification to those variables available for both control and post-
control periods and available for substantial numbers of SMSA's. Thus, 
some variables which might be expected to influence wage changes were 
omitted (such as changes in local costs of living, unavailable for all 
but .a few SMSA's) and others were represented by highly imperfect proxies 
(such as construction strike activity, represented by a measure of the 
SMSA's overall strike proneness). 
In each of the estimates presented, the unit of observation is the 
craft specific construction local in each of 141 Standard Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas. Thus, we examined the extent to which geographic 
18 
variation in the rate of change in construction union compensation re-
sponds to the geographic variation in the independent variables. 
Dependent Variable 
For each of the periods in question (1972-1973, 1973-1974, and 1976-
1977) the dependent variable was the percent change in the dollar value 
of the total negotiated package (wages plus fringe benefits) from the 
first third of the first year to the first third of the second year. 
This variable was chosen as it best represents collective bargaining in 
most construction situations. 
We were concerned with rates of change in negotiated wages and 
fringes as that (a) is the variable of concerQ at the bar&aining table 
and (b) was the variable of concern to the Construction Industry Stabil-
ization Committee during the period of economic controls. Use of rates 
of change, rather than of absolute wage levels, also facilitates com-
parisons across SMSA's, avoiding issues of unequal wage bases across 
cities and regions. 
·Further, the use of first period wages, rather than year-end wages 
in calculating the rates of change was an important decision. Inspec-
tion of contract expiration dates in the files of the Office of Construe-
tion Industry Services indicated that the majority of contracts were 
neg9tiated during the second third of the year. Many contracts are im-
plemented in "steps," the full effect of the negotiated package not be-
ing realized until late in the life of the contract. Thus, the full ef-
feet of 1975 negotiations were t~nifested in the first third of 1976, 
but (for some contracts) not in the last third of 1975. The effects of 
1976 negotiations began to show up in the second third of 1976, but were 
not (for some contracts) fully manifested until the first third of 1977. 
I 
I 
I 
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Thus, to measure the full impact of 1976 negotiations, one must compare 
first third 1976 wages and fringes (which reflect 1975 negotiations) and 
first third 1977 wages and fringes (which reflect 1976 negotiations). 
Independent Variables 
Unemployment: We hypothesized that the higher is the rate 
of unemployment in an SMSA at the time the contract was ne-
gotiated, the lower is the rate of change in the compensa-
tion package. 
Percent change in the manufacturing wage: It was hypothe-
sized that the higher is the rate of change in manufactur-
ing wages over the life of the contract negotiated in con-
struction, the higher is the rate of change in construction 
compensation. This relationship follows from the ability 
of construction craftsmen to seek employment in manufac-
~uring as was ~etailed in the 1980 Annual Construction In-
dustry Report. 
Percent change in the dollar volume of construction ac-
tivity: To the extent that construction wages respond to 
the derived demand for construction labor, the greater is 
the rate of change in construction labor, the greater is 
the rate of change in construction activity, the greater 
should be ·the rate of change in construction compensation 
(the construction volume data used here is that collected 
by F. W. Dodge). 
Percent change in the dollar volume of craft-specific con-
struction activity: For a few of the crafts under consider-
ation, one can identify spec_ific types of construction ac-
tivity that are of special importance. It was hypothesized 
that, for those crafts, the higher the rate of change in 
craft-specific construction activity, the higher would be 
the rate of change in compensation. The crafts for which 
such. specific forms of construction were identified are 
shown below with their special activity categories. 
Carpenters--wood frame structures 
Crane Operators--tall buildings, roads, earth 
structures 
Iron Workers--iron frame structures 
Pipe Fitters--pipe projects, pipelines 
Teamsters--roads. 
Expectation of public sector share: This variable was de-
fined to be the .average public sector share of total con-
struction in the SMSA over the period 1972-1979, inclu-
sive. As public sector projects are announced far in ad-
vance, and are often of long duration, they should affect 
the construction labor market prospectively, concurrently, 
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and retroactively. To the extent that Davis-Bacon re-
quirements alter the local wage structure (both through 
federal projects and through federally subsidized state 
and local projects), we hypothesized that the greater is 
this variable, the greater should be the rate of change 
in construction compensation. 
Percent change in the share of total construction activity 
accounted for by the public sector: As in the previous 
variable, this variable was included to account fo.r possi-
ble Davis-Bacon effects. We hypothesized that the greater 
was this rate of change, the greater would be the rate of 
changes in construction compensation. 
4 Degree of unionization in construction: Following Rosen, 
we hypothesized that the greater is the degree of unioniza-
tion of the construction labor force, the greater should 
be the rate of change in construction compensation. Due 
to limitations in the data set, the variable employed for 
all crafts was the propor tion of the total construction 
labor force belonging to unions in 1972. 
Strike frequency: Mills found the frequency of strikes 
in construction to be onesof the chief determinants of 
construction union wages. We were limited in our estima-
tion to using the ratio of total strikes in the SMSA (all 
industries) to total SMSA strikes in 1971. We hypothe-
sized that the greater was the local propensity to strike, 
the greater would be the rate of change in construction 
compensation. 
Presence of a Right-to-Work Law: It is often suggested 
that right-to-work laws serve to weaken unions as insti-
tutions. We hypothesized that the presence of a right-
to-work law would depress the rate of change in union 
compensation. 
Coordinated bargaining: Hartman and Franke have dis-
cussed the encouragement given by the Construction Indus-
try Stabilization Council (and its predecessor)
6
to the 
consolidation of construction bargaining units. We hy-
pothesized that this encouragement was to make construc-
tion agreements easier to police and, at least during the 
period of controls, would serve to depress the rate of 
change in construction union compensation. Our source of 
data was the report on the existence of wide-a7ea and 
multi-craft agreements by Cullen and Feinberg. Both 
wide-area and multi-craft agreements were coded as coor-
dinated bargaining, if either applied to the craft local 
in question. 
Regional dummies: Mills found location in the upper Mid-
west to have a significant effect in increasiHg the rate 
of change in construction union compensation. To test 
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for effects inherent in location in other regions, we in-
cluded dummies for all regions of the country (the South 
Atlantic region was omitted, to avoid a singular data ma-
trix, and is, thus, the region against which other re-
gional effects are compared). The definitions of geo-
graphic regions are listed in Appendix I. We anticipated 
that regions experiencing rapid economic growth would 
show greater rates of change in construction compensa-
tion, while the opposite would be true for regions ex-
periencing economic decline . 
Plumbers' wage change: Some researchers believe that the 
key union in a contour is the one most successful in win-
ning wage increases. Inspection of our results indicated 
that the rate of change of unionized plumbers was consist-
ently greater than the average for all crafts (see Table 
I). Thus, in one set of regressions, the rate of change 
of plumbers' wages was included, in addition to economic 
and bargaining structure variables. We anticipated that 
this variable would exert an independent effect. That 
is, plumbers' wages would respond to economic factors and 
other construction wages would r espond to changes in 
plumbers' wages. 
A Note on Estimation 
In those cases for which change in manufacturing wages, degree of 
unionization, or strike frequency were missing from the data base, those 
variables were entered at their mean values. This procedure produced no 
bias in ~he coefficients estimated and preserves the information that 
would otherwise be lost about effects of the non-missing variables. 
The Estimates 
The estimated coefficients for our wage change equation are pre-
sented in Tables II-IX. Tables II-IV present craft-specific estimates 
for 1972-1973, 1973-1974, and 1976- 1977, respectively; Table V reports 
estimates for a similar equation, employing the rate of change in 
plumbers' wages as an independent va riable. Tables VI-VIII report es-
timates for regressions on pooled data (all crafts included), with di-
chotomous variables representing membership in each craft (cement masons 
·~ 
I 
.. 
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are the omitted craft). Table IX reports estimates for a similar equa-
tion, pooled across crafts (plumbers omitted from the pool) using the 
rate of change in plumbers' wages as an independent variable. 
Looking first at the results for individual crafts, several fea-
tures of these estimates merit attention. First, the explanatory power 
of the model is quite low. If one disregards the results for cement ma-
2 sons (for reasons discussed below) the average adjusted R 's for the 
years under consideration are: '72-'73, .083; '73-'74, .096; and '76-
'77, .117. While these are quite low, we note that, as one would ex-
pect, the economic/bargaining structure model explains a greater share 
of the variance in the dependent variable for the post-control period 
('76-'77) than for either of the periods during economic cbntrols ('72-
'73 and '73-'74) • 
In evaluating the estimates reported here, it may be useful to 
neglect the estimates for cement masons. There were far fewer observa-
tiona for cement masons than for the other crafts reported. Thus, some 
of the independent variables were not entered into the regression by our 
software package, and for the variables entered, there were too few de-
grees of freedom to generate reliable estimates. 
I 
Comparing estimated coefficients and their statistical signifi~ 
cances across Tables II-IV, one can see that the role of labor market 
tightness, as measured by unemployment, is quite small during the period 
of economic controls, its coefficient being significant for only three 
crafts in 1972-73 (one of those being cement masons), and for only one 
craft in 1973~74. For the post-control period, however, unemployment is 
a significant determinant of the rate of change of compensation for a 
majority of the crafts considered. In every case in which unemployment 
.. 
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exerted a significant effect on the dependent variable, its sign is as 
predicted (higher unemployment generating lower rates of change in com-
pens a tion) • 
While we anticipated that construction wages would be tied closely 
to manufacturing wages (and, thus, their rates of change would be highly 
related), this was not the case. Neither in the period of economic con-
trols nor in the post-control period were rates of change in construe-
tion compensation significantly affected by rates of change in manufac-
turing/wages, except for a small number of the crafts. Perhaps this is 
because manufacturing wages were more closely tied to nonunion construe-
tion wages, which were not included in our data. If manufacturing 
~ 
workers can more easily enter the nonunion construction labor market, 
this might be the case. 
' 
While we anticipated that construction wages would be highly sensi-
tive to the volume of construction activity (and, thus, their rates of 
change highly related), this was not the case, at least insofar as the 
volume of construction activity was measured by the data generated by 
F. W. Dodge Company. We find it difficult to accept that construction 
wages are not moved by demand for the industry's output, especially in 
light of the estimated coefficients of our regional dummy variables. 
Two explanations are possible. First, the Dodge data may simply not 
reflect true construction volume. We are unable to test this possibil-
ity. Second, our aggregation of Dodge county data into SMSA's may not 
represent relevant labor markets. If construction workers are highly 
mobile, relevant labor markets may be more nearly statewide or regional 
than specific to SMSA's. Such extensive labor market areas would be 
24 
consistent with our low significance of local building activity measures 
and high significance of regional effects. 
The estimated effect of public sector building on wages, while us-
usally positive (as expected) when significant, was significant in only 
a few cases. The effect of Davis-Bacon provisions on the rates of 
change in union wages was not as great as anticipated. While one would 
anticipate the Davis-Bacon (public sector) variables to be more irnpor-
tant in the nonunion sector, we anticipated that public sector building 
activity would shield union construction workers from nonunion cornpeti-
tion, and, thus, generate enhanced bargaining power. This appeared to be 
the case for only a few crafts, generally those possessing lower degrees 
of skill. 
Of the bargaining structure variable s (right-to-work, coordinated 
bargaining, . degree of unionization, and strike frequency), only the co-
ordinated bargaining variable shows any great degrees of significance. 
In part, this is due to the very imperfect proxies that are used to 
measure degree of unionization and strike proneness. The results for 
1973-1974 (Table III) suggest that coordinated bargaining made union 
construction wages easier to control, and may account for the CISC's en-
couragement of multi-craft and wide-area bargaining structures. 
The estimated coefficients for our regional dummies are unsurpris-
ing. Location in the rapidly growing West South Central and Mountain 
regions tend to generate larger rates of wage increase during both con-
trol and post-control periods. 
Note the general unresponsiveness of teamsters' compensation to any 
construction-specific independent variable in all three periods under 
consideration. This result suggests that, even for teamsters employed 
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in construction, wages are based on the markets for intra-city and over-
the-road trucking. 
When the rate of change of plumbers' compensation is included as an 
independent variable, little change occurs in the estimated coefficients 
(see Table V). The signs, estimated values, and levels of significance 
of the coefficients for vi~tually all of the crafts in the 1976-1977 re-
gression are left virtually unchanged by adding this additional explana-
tory variable. The average adjusted R2, however, increases from 0.117 
to 0.152, reflecting the additional explanatory power of this variable. 
One source of this explanatory power which must be mentioned is 
shared, unexplained variance. Most of the variance in each craft's rate 
of compensation (including that of plumbers) is unaccountea for by our 
regression equations. If then, these error components are correlated 
across crafts, introducing plumbers' unexplained variance (embedded in 
the rate of change of compensation variable) as an independent variable 
will, necessarily generate a significant coefficient and enhance the 
adjusted R2• That this artifact of shared variance is not the dominant 
effect measured by the coefficient of the plumbers' ' wage variable is sug-
gested by the fact that not all of the crafts' rates of compensation 
cha~ge are affected significantly by the rate of change of plumbers' com-
pensation. While we hesitate to infer that plumbers are key crafts, 
whose wage changes are followed by bricklayers, electricians, laborers, 
pipefitters, and sheet metal workers, such a conclusion is consistent 
with our estimates. 
The generally low degree to which economic and bargaining struc-
ture variables seem to affect rates of change in compensation of union-
ized craft workers is consistent with the "balkanization" suggested by 
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Kerr and others. That is, craft locals set wages on some equity basis, 
possibly by following a key local, and let employment in the union sec-
tor adjust to the new wage, rather than causation being the reverse. If 
union workers become disemployed, they then enter the nonunion sector, 
making it more sensitive to economic conditions than it would otherwise 
be. Such a hypothesis suggests further research on the nonunion labor 
segment of the construction industry is needed. Chapter IV of this re-
port represents an attempt to study this issue further. 
Tables VI-IX report the results of pooling observations across 
crafts and introducing craft-specific ·dummy variables (cement masons is 
omitted to avoid a singular data matrix). From these results, one can 
. 
examine further the inter-craft differences in the rate of change of to-
tal compensation reported in Table I. One must be cautious in the inter-
pretation of these estimates, however. The results of the F-test for 
the legitimacy of pooling suggested by Maddala indicate that, in pooling 
9 across crafts, much information is lost. That is, the differences in 
the responses to the independent variables across crafts are statis-
tically significant, and forcing the responses to be uniform (by esti-
mating a single multi-craft equation) generates coefficients that are 
. 
not representative of the behavior of any single craft's compensation. 
The ·results of these pooled regressions, nonetheless, reflects 
quite well the results for the individual craft regressions. For the 
control periods, unemp~oyment is the only economic variable that sig-
nificantly influences wages. For the post-control, the two Davis-Bacon 
variables become statistically significant. All of these significant 
coefficients have the expected signs. 
27 
Variables reflecting bargaining structure behave inconsistently 
over the years. The presence of a right-to-work law exerts a signifi-
cant positive effect on change in compensation for 1972-1973 only. Co-
ordinated bargaining exerts a significant depressant effect on the de-
pendent variable for 1973-1974 (possibly because such agreements were 
easy . to police). but not for any other year under consideration. Simi-
larly. degree of unionization exerts a depressant effect on the depen-
dent variable in 1973-1974 (perhaps for the same reason). In our re-
sults. relative strike frequency never has a significant coefficient. 
This is contrary to intuition and to the results reported by Mills. We 
reiterate the dubious nature of the strike variable we were forced to 
~ 
use. Further research on this issue. using the data on construction 
strikes maintained (but not released) by the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
may provide further insight. 
For 1972-1973. there are no significant differences in the rate of 
change of compensation across crafts. That suggests that the policy of 
the CISC was to grant uniform compensation increases to each craft in an 
SMSA. For 1973-1974. however. there is some evidence that the CISC 
attempted to restructure the relative wages in each SMSA by granting 
differential w~ge increases. In 1976-1977. in the absence of controls. 
market forces again made differential wage increases obtain. 
As shown in Table IX. the coefficients that result from removing 
plumbers from the sample and using the rate of change in plumbers' wages 
are very similar to those for the full sample without the additional in-
dependent variable. As expected. the estimated coefficient of the rate 
of change of plumbers' wages is positive and highly significant. 
.. 
~ Average Percent 
All Crafts 
Bricklayers 
Carpenters 
Cement Masons · 
Crane Oper~tors 
Electricians 
Iron Workers 
Laborers 
Painters 
t ~ Pipefitters 
Plasterers 
~ 
Plumbers 
~ .. Roofers 
' 
Sheet Metal Workers 
Teamsters 
• .,,,,, • .,... -.:"1''~11. ~ ' ·~· 
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TABLE I 
Changes in Total Compensation 
1972-73 1973-74 1976-77 
7.21 7.83 . 6.91 
6.59 7.26 5.97 
7:92 7.42 7.26 
7.43 5.20 3.89 
7.65 7.66 6.62 
7.61 7.43 8.16 
7.79 7.55 8.14 
7.56 8.15 7.01 
.. 
7.36 7.63 6.88 
6.49 8.49 7.28 
6.96 7.91 6.41 
6.47 ~.43 7.62 
6.74 7.99 6.95 
7. 31' 8.49 6.34 
7.22 7.84 5.75 
r 
I 
I 
I 
I 
l 
{ 
_ _j 
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TABI..i: U 
OETER.'IINA.~TS OF THE RATE o~· Cli.\.~CE OF TOTAL COMPENSATION 
1972-1973 
(t-statistics in pa.roenth~!ses) 
l:tD~PEliPEST VARIABLE CRAfT 
Sheet 
Brick- Carpen- Cement Crane Op- El.ectri- Iron Pipe- Pl~s- ~tal T~•~~-
lolyer• ters Masons eratora clans Workers taborers Painters Utters tt~:rers Plur.Jbers Roofers Workers stcrs 
~ndp1o)'1'0!nt (1972) 
l thu,e 1ft """· \/age 
(1972-73) 
0.230 0 . 071 0.220 0.084 
-0.001 -0.00) 0.003 o . ooo 
(O.S~) (2.18)** (0.45) (0.15) 
0.01Z 0. 326 -1.810 -0.146 
(0,23) (l. 22) (l. 76)* (0.71) 
t Chuge 1a Cori•t. Act. -0.002 o:o12 0.025 -0.004 
(1912-13) (0.19) (1.10) (0.46) (0.36) 
% Chana• in Croft-Specific -
Con•<· Act. (1972"73) 
o.ooo 
(0.41) 
0.001 
(0.31) 
Expectation of Public O.OZ9 -0.006 -0.126 0.014 
Sector Share (1~72-79) (0.49) (0.10) (0. 70) (0.32) 
t Chana• in Public Sector -0.003 0.006 0.044 0.001 
Share (197Z-7l) (0.40) (0. 11) (1.24) (0,14) 
o~cree of Un1ol'li&at1on 
Rcletlv• Strike Frequency 
<i:;i> 
Rl&ht-to-Worlt Law 
O.Oll 
(0.38) 
o . ooo 
(0.00) 
-0.037 
(1.32) 
-0.003 
(0.31) 
-0.167 
(1.38) 
0.036 
(0,54) 
-0.024 
(1.11) 
-0.002 
(0.27) 
0.027 0.014 0.019 
(2.02)** (l.ll) (1.97) (1.97) 
0.072 
-0.000 
(0.16) 
0.054 
(0.25) 
-0.003 
(0.35) 
-0.003 
(0.08) 
-0.004 
(0.66) 
0.016 
(0. 73) 
0.004 
(0.55) 
0.012 
(1.12) 
0.070 0.130 0.051 0 . 080 0 . 121 0 , 073 0.040 0.074 O.B8 
-0.001 -o.oo3 -o.ooo -o.ooo -o.oo3 -o.ooo -o.oo1 -o.oo1 -o.ooz 
(0.81) (1.75)* (0.10) (0.00) (1. 77)* (0.18) (0.53) (1.03) (1.47) 
-0.412 -0.042 0.122 -0.120 0.232 -0.045 0.368 0.099 -0.375 
(1.78)• (0.13) (0.46) (0.48) (0 . 78) (0.19) (1.63) (0.45) (1.60) 
-0.002 0.013 0.004 0.001 0.017 -0.003 0.001 -0.002 0.019 
(0.15) (0.92) (0.37) (0.11) (1.32) (0.30) (0.13) (0.21) (1.68)* 
0~000 
(0.46) 
-0.000 
(0.84) 
-0.003 
(1.00) 
0 , 054 -0.024 0,032 O.Oll -0.060 0.024 -0.030 -0.040 -0.001 
(0.98) (0.37) (0.58) (0.22) (0.97) (0.50) (0.64) (0.89) (0.00) 
-0.007 -0 . 007 0 . 009 0.001 -0.003 -0.003 0.002 0.001 0.007 
(0.81) (0.68) (1.10) (0.15) (0.30) (0.39) (0.03) (0 . 09) (0.9Z) 
0.015 
(0.54) 
0.010 
(1.16) 
-0.009 
(0.27) 
0.003 
(0. 26) 
0.010 
(0.33) 
-0.004 
(0.41) 
- 0.022 
(0.84) 
-0.008 
(0.97) 
0.001 
(0.04) 
- 0.002 
(0 . 21) 
-0.008 
(0. 35) . 
-0.006 
(0.77) 
0.013 
(0. 54) 
0.002 
(0.33) 
0.012 
(0. 53) 
0.004 
(0.05) 
-0 . 051 
(2.07) •• 
-0.013 
(1.61) 
0.007 -0.003 0.011 0.006 -0.10 -0.000 0.010 0.009 -0.010 
(0.54) (0.17) (0.90) (0.49) (0.69) (0.00) (0.89) (0.82) (1.23) 
Coordinated B~rga1nin& 0.007 0.011 -0.001 0.006 -0.020 0.011 -0,016 -o.o14 -o.oo2 -0.011 -o.ooo o.oo2 o.oo9 -0.010 
M ldd l• At 1ant lc 
•est South Centr"'l 
Hountatn 
Pacific 
n of obaervatione 
(0.67) (1.19) (0,00) (0.86) (2.70)••• (1.80)* (1.44) (1.51) (0.22) (1.10) (0.05) (0.19) (1.12) (1.23) 
0.043 0.043 . 0.055 0.003 0 . 044 0.019 -0,016 0.010 0.023 . -0.015 0.012 0.019 0.001 0.007 
(2.35)** (2 . 44) .. (0.79) (0.25) (3.08)••• (1.09) (0.78) (0.56) (1.37) (0.76) (0.76) (1.29) (0.02) (0.43) 
0.025 0.004 0.049 -0.008 -0.004 
(0.28) (1.54) (0.27) (0.60) (0.71) 
0.009 -0.002 -0.038 0.001 -o.oo5 
(0.38) (0.52) (0.10) (0.54) (0.04) 
o.oos -0 . 002 
(0.28) (0.10) 
-0.012 0.002 
(0.53) (Cl.ll) 
0.018 0.028 
(1.13) (1 . 81)* 
0.026 0.038 
( 1.03) (1. 58) 
0.014 0.068 
(1.65)* (3.53)*** 
0.12 
-o.oo 
1.00 
141 
0.31 
0.21 
3.03 
141 
0.35 
-0.07 
0.84 
29 
-o.025 -D.015 
(1.93)• (1.09) 
-c.ou o.oo5 
(0. 71) (0. 28) 
0.022 0.001 
(1.88)* (O.ll) 
0.007 
(O.Jo) 
0.015 
(1.01) 
0.25 
0.14 
2.24 
141 
0.012 
(0.60) 
0.004 
(0.23) 
0.30 
0.21 
3,13 
141 
-o.oos -0 .011 o.o3o o.oo1 -0.020 -o.ol4 o.oo1 0.001 o . oN 
(0,50) (0.89) (2.00)** (0.07) (1.56) (1.00) (0.52) (0,09) (0.28) 
-o.ol7 -0.038 -o.oo5 o.oo1 -o.o45 -o.oo4 -o.oos -o.o3o -o.o1o 
(1.05) (1.90)* (0.31) (0.47) (2.45)** (0.27) (0,56) (2.23)** (0.70) 
-o.OlJ -0.022 -D.011 0.003 -0.016 0.002 0.005 -0.020 •0.015 
(0.80) (1.07) (0.69) (0.18) (0.84) (0.11) (0.35) (1.42) (1,03) 
-0.030 -0, 022 0.011 -0.002 -0.019 -0.003 O.Oll -0.008 -0.014 
(1.34) (0.89) (0.51) (0.08) (0,75) (0.14) (0.68) (0.47) (0.73) 
0 . 007 0 . 017 0.028 0.020 0.009 0.015 0.036 0.015 -0.015 
(0.51) (0.92) (1.96)•• (1.40) (0.54) (1.16) (2.76)*** (l.2l) (1.15) 
-0.007 -0 . 004 0,032 0.022 -0.017 O.Q18 -0.003 0.055 0.009 
(0.28) (0.15) (1.37) (0.98) (0.63) (0.85) (0.17) (2.79)***(0.42) 
0.023 
(1. ·.8) 
0.20 
0.08 
1. 71 
141 
-0.009 
(0. 39) 
0.19 
0.08 
1. 74 
141 
0.023 
(1.20) 
0.15 
0.04 
1.31 
140 
0.~15 
(0.78) 
0.08 
-o.06 
0.56 
141 
-o . 037 
(1. 70) 
0.19 
0.07 
1.66 
141 
0.(104 
(0.26) 
0.09 
-0.04 
0.68 
140 
-0.000 
(0.00) 
0.20 
o.os 
1. 76 
141 
0.007 
(0 . 43) 
0,31 
0.22 
3. 31 
141 
O.Oll 
(0.91) 
0.17 
0.05 
1.44 
141 
•S&&nlf. •t .10 level; **!tl&nlf. at .0) level; ***signif. at .Ollevel. 
r: 
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,fABLE III 
DETERMINANTS OF THE RATE OF CHANG~ OF TOT,\1. CO~!PENSATION 
197l-1974 
(t-statiatics in parenthesi!s) 
I~OEPE~UENT VARIABLE C!L\FT 
Sheet 
Rric:k- Carpen• Cement Crane Op- Electri- Iron Pipe- Pl3s- Netal Team-
layers toera Masons eratora clans Workers Laborers Painters fitters terers Plur.~ben Roofers Workers sters 
Const.an.t 0.050 0.120 0.052 0.051 
Unoap1a,...nt .(l97J) -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 0.002 
(1.29) (1.53) (0.49) (0. 74) 
l Change in !Yn. Waae 
. (197:1-74) . 
0.058 -0.337 0.010 0.106 
(0.37) (2.40)** (0.04) (0.51) 
% Ch.1nce in toaot. Aet. 0.004 -0.005 -0.013 o.ooo 
' (1973-74) (0.8d) (1.22) (0.98) (0.03) 
% Chango in Craft-Specific -
Conot. ACt • . (1.973-74) 
-0.002 
(2.24)•• 
-0.002 
(0.32) 
Expectation of Public -0.004 -O.OI7 0.047 0.018 
Sector Shue . (1972~79) (0.09) (0.40) (0.92) (0.28) 
% Change in Pub1lc S..ctor -0.004 
Share (1973-74) (0.64) 
0.004 -0.023 0.006 
(0. 75) (2.53)** (0.67) 
Degree of Untonlzatioo -0.018 -0.003 -0.033 -0.004 
(0. 78) (0.16) (0.90) (0.12) 
Aelath•e Strike Frequency 0.000 
(~:~~) (0.03) 
-0.00) 
(0.30) 
U&ht-to-Worlt Lav 0.036 -0.001 
(3.I7l~**(0.14) 
0.023 0.001 
(1.81)* (0.09) 
-0.013 
(0.87) 
0.057 
0.003 
(1.51) 
.-D.08J 
(0.65) 
0.004 
(!.OJ) 
0.033 
(0.84) 
0.002 
(0.31) 
-0.008 
(0.41) 
0.010 
(1.18) 
0.014 
(1.54) 
0.087 0.087 0.088 0 . 052 0.080 0.034 0 . 081 0.090 O.IIO 
-o.oo1 o.oo1 -o.oo6 o.oo1 -o.ooo o.oo1 o.oo4 -o.oo1 -o.ooo 
(0.41) (0.28) (2.29)** (0.24) (0.07) (0.27) (1.17) (0.46) (0.03) 
-0.127 0.023 0.151 o:ooo 0.039 0.053 0.042 -0.248 0.007 
(0.88) '(0.11) (0.87) (0.00) (0.17) (0.31) (0.18) (1.23) (0.03) 
-o.oo5 -o.oo2 -o.oo1 o.oo9 -o.oo4 o.oo9 -o.oo9 o.oo3 -o.ooo 
(1.08) (0.28) (0.27) (1.75)* (0.51) (1.73)• (1.31) (0.52} (0.00) 
-0.001 
(0.97) 
-0.001 
(1.27) 
0.000 
(0.54) 
0.035 -0.012 0.020 0.072 0.039 .0.112 -0.004 -o.007 •0.041 
(0.77) (0.19) (0.37) (1.40) (0.54) (2.07)** (0.07) (0.12) (0.40) 
0.015 -0.003 -0.018 0.007 -0.006 0.004 -0.006 0.004 -0.014 
(2.69)***(0.42) (2.64)***(0.95) (0.65) (0.63) (0.64) (0.47) (0 . 96) 
-0.030 -0.044 -0.026 -0.034 -0.040 -0.023 0.007 0.002 -O.Ol4 
(1.41) (1.44) (0.98) (1.34) (1.13) (0.91) (0.19) (0.07) (0 . 25) 
-0.013 
(1.41) 
-0.004 
(0.34) 
0.001 
(0.13) 
0.018 -0.016 
(1.66)* (1.05) 
0.019 0.008 
(1. 73)* (0.57) 
0.002 0.018 
(O.I4) ' (0.90) 
0.004 0.004 0.004 0.015 0.007 0.009 -0.021 o.ooo 0.016 
(0.41) (0.28) (0.35) (1.22) (0.39) (0.68) (1.25) (0.03) (0.66) 
0.018 0.001 0.002 -0.014· -0.015 0.005 0.012 0.014 -0.027 0.010 -0.022 -0.033 0.009- -0.037 
Nev E.nl: land 
~tdd1e Atlancic 
.- Eaat South Central 
!'fount& in. 
Pactftc 
r 
n of obaeCYa:t ion• 
(2.23)** (0.!4) (0.21) (1.28) (2.33)** (0.61) (l.lS) (1 . 63) (3.12)***(0.89) (2.52)** (2.82)***(0.82) (2.28)** 
0.026 -0.004 0.002 0.032 -0.016 
(1.67)* (0.31) (0.12) (1.57)* (1.24) 
o.ou 
·(0•81) 
0.00) 
(0.29) 
-0.010 
(0.59) 
-o.ooo 
(0.03) 
0.024 -0.006 -0.018 0.015 
(1.65)* (0.46) (0.86) (0.79) 
O.OJJ 0.015 
(2.21)** (1.11) 
0.027 0.04I 
(1.45) (2.41)** 
0.008 0.020 
(0.61) (1.74)* 
0.020 
(1.02) 
0.038 
(1.53) 
0.016 
(0.93) 
0.003 
(0.31) 
0.007 
(0.62) 
0.005 
(0.37) 
-0.023 
(1.46) 
0.005 
(0.48), 
0.003 -0.020 ll.030 0.005 -0.015 0.001 -0.019 0.014 -0.040 
(0.23) (1.01) (1. 74)* (0.31) (0.63) (0.03) (0.85) (0. 70) (1. 26) 
0.007 
(0.57) 
0.005 
(0.26) 
-0.001 
(0.07) 
0.021 
(1.49) 
0.005 
(0.24) 
0.001 
(0.09) 
-0.011 
(0.59) 
0.022 
(1. ~9) 
-0.010 
(0.35) 
o.oo8 o.oo1 o.oo1 o.o42 o.013 o.on -0.010 -o.ooo o.o1s 
(0.63) (0.04) (0.03) (2.73)***(0.61) (2.03)** (0.49) (0.00) (0.59) 
0.025 0.041 O.OIO 0 . 029 0.010 0.024 0.007 -0.003 0.0)1 
(1.80) (2.11)** (0.62) (1.79)* (0.46) (1.44) (0.33) (0.14) (0.99) 
o.o35 o.oo1 -o.oll o.o74 o . o1o o.on o.oiS o.oo6 o.o•o 
(1.99)** (O.JO) (0.52) (3.61)***(0.35) (3.53)***(0.53) (0.24) (1.01) 
0.002 0.030 0.001 0.014 0.036 O.Oll 0.017 -O.OOJ 0.022 
(0.14) (1.73)* (0.06) (1.02) (1.82)* (0.91) (0.87) (0.17) (0 . 78) 
-0.001 0.061 0.060 0.033 0.019 0.021 0.020 0.034 0.032 0.036 0.007 0.050 0.020 
(0.07) ·().4I)*** 
0.061 0.017 
(3.49)***(1.11) 
0.26 
0.16 
2.60 
141 
0.25 
0.14 
2.28 
141 
0.63 
0.39 
2.61 
29 
(2.20)** '(1.95)* (1.00) (0. 76) (0.88) (1.53) (1.05) (1.59) (0.24) (1.90)* (0.49) 
. 0.006 
(0.25) 
0.1 '• 
0.02 
1.13 
141 
0.002 
(O.ll) 
0.18 
0.07 
1,.58 
141 
o.046 o.o44 o.o23 o.082 . o.on o.076 o.on o·.o66 o.ou 
(2.85)***(1.91)* (1.19) (4.25)**•(1.92)* (3.91)***(0.88) (2.51)***(0.48) 
0.21 
0.09 
l. 79 
141 
0.20 
0.09 
1.86 
141 
0.14 0.34 
0.02 0.24 
1.14 3.47 
141 141 
0.14 
O.OJ 
1.21 
141 
O.Jl 
0.22 
3.28 
140 
0.18 
0.07 
1.62 
141 
0.20 
0.•>9 
1.80 
141 
o.u 
0.02 
1.13 
141 
*SlgnH.- at .10 level; 1Ustgntf. at .OS level; ***sign1f. at .01 level. 
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TABLE IV 
OETER.~INA.~TS OP THE RATE OF CHANGE OF TOTAL· COMPENSATION 
1976-1977 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
ISOt:PESUE~T VARIARLE CRAFT 
Sheet 
Brick- Carpen- Cement Crane Op- Electri- Iron Pipe- Pl.1s- ~letal Te.l.m-
laycr¥ tere Masons erators clans Workers Laborers Painters fitters terers Plumbers Roofers Workers stet$ 
CoJnst.lnt 
tnemploy,..nt (1~76) 
0.046 0.076 0.098 0.064 
-0.004 -0.005 -0.010 0.000 
(2.42)** (3.l3) .. *(2.27)•• (0.34) 
0.058 
0.002 
(0.89) 
% Chan~• in Han. Wo~ge 
(197b-77) 
0.1S7 0.278 0.405 ·0.090 0.215 
(1.02) (1.79)* (0.92) (0.69) . (1.20) 
% Change in C~nst. Act. 0.001 0.004 0.007 -0.004 
(1976-77) (0.20) (1.48) (1.36) (1.46) 
% Change in Craft-Specific -
Const. Act. (1976-77) 
-0.001 
(1.04) 
0.002 
(0.66) 
Expectation of Public 0.011 0.037 -0.075 -0.005 
Sector Share (1972-79) (1.49) (0.78) (0.71) (0.12) 
% Ch•.nge in Publlc Sector 0.001 0.002 0.010 -0.001 
Share (1976-77) (0.65) (1.10) (0.93) (0.96) 
Dear•• of l.lnlonlution 0.012 0.007 0.003 -0.014 
(0.55) (0. 30) (0.05) (0. 74) 
Rel.attve Strike Frequency -0.004 -0.009 
(1.20) 
0.010 -0.005 
(0.48) (0. 78) <~:;1> (0.45) 
Right-co-;:ork Law -o.o15 -o.oo~ 
(1.40) (0.47) 
. 0.003 
(0.31) 
0.001 
(0.41) 
-0.025 
(0.46) 
0.001 
(0.66) 
0.021 
(0. 79) 
0.007 
(0.73) 
-0.007 
(0.59) 
0.069 0.072 0.040 0.054 0.063 0.049 -0.020 0.070 0.108 
-0.003 -0.003 0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.005 0.002 -0.004 -0.008 
(2.05)•• (5.784)***(0.46) (1.71)• (1.07) (2.09)** (0.50) (1.58) (1.75)• 
o.194 o.226 o.154 o.4oe o.279 o.265 -o.19o o.218 -0.499 
(1. 20) (1. 43) (0. 76) (2. 71) ***(1. ~4) (1.07) (0. 46) (0. 91) (1.10) 
-o.oo1 o.oo2 -o.ooJ o.oo1 o.oo3 o.o16 -o.oo~ o.004 -o.oo6 
(1.20) (0.78) (0.92) (0.18) (0.91) (3.35)***(0.71) (1.00) (0.65) 
-0.000 
(0.28) 
0.000 
(1.19) 
0.003 
(0.54) 
0.057 0.014 0.042 -0.056 0.008 0.020 0.08) 0.154 0.045 
(1.14) (0.30) (0.68) (1.22) (0.14) (0.25) (0.66) (2.13)** (0.32) 
0.001 0.006 0.001 -0.000 0.006 0.001 0.002 0.006 -0.004 
(0.94) (3.56)***(0 . 49) (0.28) (2.96)***(0.28) (0.50) (2.23)** (0.80) 
-0.009 0.009 -0.005 0.034 0.017 0.029 o.oos -0.029 -0.086 
(0.40) (0.41) (0.15) (1.57) (0.67) (0.81) (0.09) (0.85) (1.30) 
-0.008 
(0.94) 
-0.007 
(0.90) 
0.006 -0.007 
(0.55) (0.90) 
-0.010 -~.005 
(1.06) (0.42) 
0.016 -0.012 
(0. 79) . (0. 99) 
0.005 
(0.24) 
0.009 0.022 -0.026 0.021 0.011 0.021 0.007 -0.018 -0.022 
(0.81) (1.91)•• (1.81)* (1.97)** (0.84) (1.14) (0.2~) (1.05) (0.67) 
Coordinated largainLng o.ooo 0.003 0.001 -0 . 000 -0.016 -0.002 - 0.008 -0.000 0.012 -0.007 0.017 0.020 -0.00~ 0.024 
Sev England 
Middle At lartt te 
East Nonh Central 
ilest Sortlt Central 
East South Central 
West South Central 
Pacltlc 
n of observation• 
{0.0)) (0.42) (0.05) (.0.0)) (1.78)* (0.18) (0.97) (0.04) (1.54) (0.84) (1.35) {0.95) {0.38) (1.05) 
-0.007 -0.019 0.007 -0.022 -0.017 
(0.53) (1.33) (0.31) (1.77)* (1 . 00) 
-o.002 -0.003 0.024 -0.001 
(0.17) (0.21) (0.81) (0.08) 
0.008 -0.006 0.002 0.007 
(0.64) (0.42) {0.06) (0.63) 
0.013 -0.013 
{0.89). (0.91) 
-0.001 -0.011 
(0.06) (0.~6) 
0.010 
(0.81) 
0.008 
(0.~0) 
~0.010 
(0.65) 
-o.022 
(1.39) 
-0.010 
(0.~7) 
0.028 
(1.29) 
0.0)7 0.024 
(2.93)***(1.87)* 
0.039 0 . 015 
(3.64)••• (1.05) 
o.o41 -o.co~ 
{2.06) .. (0.24) 
-0.001 
(0.08) 
-0.002 
(0.07) 
0.045 -0.007 -0.024 -0.009 -0.025 0.031 0.024 -0.043 -0.027 
(2.98)***(0.46) (1.27) (0.69) {1.52) {1.32) (0.63) (1.94)* (0.64) 
o.oo~ -o.ooo -0.019 -o.no4 -o.o11 o.oo5 -0.017 -o.032 -o.o28 
(0.42) (0.00) (1.14) (0.37) (1.10) (0.25) (0.50) (1.59) (0.74) 
0.009 0.008 -0.002 -O.C47 -0.006 -0.009 0.046 -0.009 -0.034 
(0.65) (0.56) (0.12) (1.32) (0.36) . (0.40) (1.27) (0.43) (0.84) 
-0.001 -0.019 0.018 0.001 - 0.028 -0.020 0.0)9 -0.003 -0.005 
(0.04) (1.27) (0.94) (0.08) (1.66) (0.83) (1.01) (0.15) (0.11) 
-o.oo6 -o.oos o.ou -o.ou -o.oo5 -o.oo4 o.o21 -o.ooo -o.on 
(0.92) (0.26) (0.46) (0.95) (0.23) (0.15) (0.42) (0.00) (0.58) 
0.043 0.014 0.046 -0.014 0.014 -0.013 0.064 0.039 0.012 
(3.26)***(1.09) (2.82)** (1.20) (0.97) (0.62) (1.93)* (2.0l)** (0.32) 
0.013 0.013 0.026 -0.013 -0.010 -0.003 0.055 0.032 0.003 
(0.67) . (0.66) (1.00) (0.68) (0.42) (0.09) (1.05) (1.06) (0.04) 
0.040 0.063 
(2.45) .. (3.77)*** 
0.016 
(1.14) 
0.034 0.052 0.034 0.027 0.014 -0.013 0.027 0.083 0.020 0.017 
0.25 0 . 39 0.44 
0.14 0.30 0.05 
2.28*** 4.17*** 1.12 
137 1)7 28 
(1.75)* (3.00)***(2.07)** (1.25) (0.8~) (0.67) (1.01) (1.91)* (0.77) (0.37) 
0.28 0.23 0.23 0.30 0.17 
0.17 0.12 0.16 0.20 0.05 
2.59*** 2.09*** 1.98** 2.97*** 1.43 
137 137 137 137 137 
0.28 
0.17 
o. 24 
0.13 
0.17 
0.05 
2.53*** 2.17••• 1.39 
137 137 136 
0.129 o. 22 0.11 
0.004 0.10 -.03 
1.04 1.92** 0.81 
137 137 137 
*Signlf. •t .10 level; ••11gnif. at .05 lvvel; ***signif. at .01 level. 
f 
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TABLE V 
DETERMINANTS OF THE RATE o~· CIIANCE OF TOTAL COMPENSATION 
1976·1977 
(t'-atatistics in par-= nthc ses) 
CRAFT 
Sheet 
Brick- Carpen- Conaent Crane Op- Electrl- Iron Pipe- Plas- tletal Teolc -
layers ters Masone eratora clans Workers Laborers Painters fitters tere ra PlUllbers Roofers Workers at~rs 
Conatant 
% Chan&• in llan. Waae 
(1976·77) 
0.041 0.073 0 . 076 0.061 
-o.oo3 -o.oo5 -o . oo7 o.oo1 
(2.09) .. (2.90)***(1.68)* (0.53) 
0.129 0 . 263 0.425 0.075 
(0.84) (1.68)* (0.96) (0.56) 
O.OSl 
0.002 
(1.25) 
0.181 
(1.01) 
% Chana• in Conot. Act. -0.001 0 . 0034 0.004 -0.004 -0.001 
(1976-77) (0.35) (1.11) (0.79) (1.75)* (0.20) 
% Change in Craft·Spec1fic -
Conot. Act. (1976-77) 
-0.001 
(0.985) 
0 . 001 
(0. 68) 
Expectation of Public 0.073 0.038 -0 . 058 -0 . 003 
Sector Share (1972•79) (1.56) (0.80) (0.54) (0 . 09) 
% Ch~nc• in Public Sector 0.001 0 . 002 0 . 007 - 0.00 1 
Sharo (1976·77) (0 . 61) (1.07) (0 . 73) (0.99) 
Dcaree of Unionhation 0.008 0.004 -0.000 -0.016 
(0.38) (0.216) (0.00) (0.84) 
Relative Strike Frequency -0.002 -0.008 
(1.12) (~:;~) (0.34) 
Ught•to-llork Law -0.018 -0.007 
(1.65)* (0.60) 
o.ou 
(0.53) 
0.004 
(0.69) 
0.001 
(0.14) 
-0.023 
(0.43) 
0.001 
(0.62) 
0 . 04 
(0.65) 
0.007 
(0.87) 
-O.Oll 
(0.87) 
0.069 0.066 0.037 0.040 O. OS7 
-0.003 -0 . 003 -0.012 -0. 001 -0.001 
(2.00)•• (2 . 05)** (0.58) (0.69) (0.25) 
0 . 19 0 . 194 . 0.140 0.316 0.256 
(1.17) (1.24) (0.69) (2.52)** (1. 41) 
..().004 0.001 -0.004 -0.067 0.001 
(1.16) (0.15) (1.10) (2.07)** (0.43) 
-o.ooo 
(0.27) 
0.00014 
(2.35)** 
0 . 057 0.016 0.043 -0.059 o.oos 
"(1.14) (0.34) (0.697) (1.56) (0.16) 
0.001 0.005 0.001 -0.001 0.005 
(0. 34) (3.55)***(0 . 47) (0 . 68) (2 . 94)••• 
-0.009 0 . 005 -O.C06 0.023 0 . 014 
(0.40) (0. 25) (0.2 2) (1.27) (0.56) 
-0.007 
(0.92) 
-0 . 006 
(0. 79) 
0.006 -0.004 
(0. 596) (0. 70) 
-0.008 
(0 . 98) 
o.oo9 o.oJ• -0.021 0.011 o.oo8 
(0. 79) (1.65)* (1.86) (1.31) (0.66) 
Coordinated lars,:~1n1ng -0.002 0.002 -0 . 001 -0.018 -0 .002 -0.009 -0.002 0 . 006 - 0.008 
, Nev En& land 
;-a dd to At 1nnt lc 
~at North Centr•l 
We•t North Con.cral 
East South Co.ntr·d 
\icat South Centr11l 
Hount.1ln 
Poclf lc 
X Chnnae ln Plur~bera 
llog .. (1~76•77) 
r 
(0 . 27) (2.46) .. (0.221) (2.12)•• (0 . 17) (1.27) (0. 14) (0.97) (1 . 01) 
-0.011 -0 . 0 22 0.004 -0.024 -0.011 0.045 0.01'. -0.026 -0 . 021 -0.0 28 
(O.RO) (1 . 45) (0.18) (1.93)* (l.ll) (2 . 93)***(0. 75) (1.36) (1.83)* (L. 71) 
·0. 003 ·0 .003 0.021 -0 . 001 
(0.26) (0.26) (0.74) (1.34) 
0 . 009 -0.005 0 . 003 0 . 077 
(0.69) (0.39) (0.08) (0.66) 
0.1)14 -0.012 
.(1.02) (0.83) 
-0.001 ·0.011 
(0.05) (0. 58) 
0 . 011 
(0.89) 
0,008 
(0.51) 
-0.021 
(0.76) 
-0.007 
(1.37) 
0.027 
(0.47) 
0 . 017 
(1. 27) 
0.005 0. 001 ·0 . 19 -0.009 ·0. 017 
(0.41) (0 . 11) (1.17) (0.87) (1 . 17) 
o.oo9 c.oo8 -o.oo2 .,.o16 -o.oo5 
(0.645) (0.61) (0.10) (1.46) (0.33) 
·0.001 ·0.017 0.189 0,006 ·0.026 
(0.03) (1.15) (0.98) (0.57) (1 . 57) 
-0.006 -0.004 0.011 -0.017 -0.005 
(0.31) (0.25) (0.45) - (1.09) (0. 23) 
0.019 0 . 024 
(3.13)•••(L.93)* 
0.039 -0.002 
(3.72)* .. (1.19) 
0.043 0.015 0.047 -0.017 0.015 
().24)**<(1 . 22) (2.85) (1.17) (1.04) 
0.041 - 0.0045 
(2 . 10)** (0.23) 
0.017 0.061 
(2.25)** ().63)*** 
-0.009 
(0.06) 
0 . 014 
( l.02) 
0.107 0.061 0.065 0.058 
(L.89) (1 . 04) (0.95) (1.21) 
0.26 o. )Q4 0. 4 7 o. 292 
0.15 0. 2?5 0.04 0.17 
137 1l1 28 117 
0.029 0 . 013 0 . 013 0.026 -0.012 ·0.009 
(0.089) (0 . 67) (0 . 69) (1.01) (0.77) (0. 4 2) 
- o.ou 
(1. 5! ) 
0.051 0.0380 0 . 025 0.0027 ·0.016 
(2 . 96)•••(1.79)* (1 . 15) (0 . 65) (0.83) 
1.33 0 . 004 0 . 117 0 . 057 0 . 3• '· 0 . 099 
(2.03)** (0 . 077) (2.04)•• (0 . 77) (7.43)•••(1.5 0) 
0. 256 0.232 0.)2 0.17 O.Sl 0. 251 
0.142 0.107 0 . 21 0.05 0.43 O.llh 
6.41*** 2.1 9ttu• -
137 137 137 137 137 137 
*Sl&nlf • .,, . • 10 lcvrl; ••,.tgntf. at .OS l<!vcl; •••11tgn1f. at .01 level. 
- .017 0 . 058 0.112 
0 . 002 -0.002 -0.008 
(0.50) (1.12) (1.78)* 
-0.191 0 . 156 0.516 
(0.46) (0 . 67) (1.13) 
-o.oo5 o.oo1 -o.oo.; 
(0.681 (0.60) (O . Sl) 
0.00) 
(0.56) 
0.083 0 . 155 0 . 04) 
(0 . 66) (2.20)** (O . ll) 
0.002 0.005 ·0.004 
(0.49) (2.21)•• (0 . 78) 
0 . 005 -0.004 -0 .08 
(0.08) (1.06) (1. 26) 
-0.016 
(0. 78) 
-0.010 
(0.84) 
0.004 
(0 . 21) 
0.007 -0.024 ·0 . 02 
(0.24) (1.42) (0 . 61) 
0.019 -0.008 -0.025 
(0.93) (0. 72) (1. 09) 
0.023 ·O.S\9 ·0.0~4 
(0.61) (2.35)** (0 . 57) 
- 0.017 -O . IJ34 ..().027 
(0 . 49) (1.7 6)• (0.71 ) 
0.045 -0.008 -0 .1))4 
(1.26) (0 . 40) (0 . 84) 
0.038 0.002 -0.1)06 
(1 . 00) (0.00) (0.13) 
0.021 0.003 -O.Oll 
(0.42) (0.00) (0.57) 
o.0~4 o.oa o.~to 
(1,92)• (2.12)•• (0 . 2~) 
o.05 4 o.on o .o•J2 
(1.05) (1.10) (0 . 04) 
0.082 0.012 0.01 ? 
(L.88)* (l.49) (0 .4:1 
0.007 0.231 ·O.OoS 
(0.044) (2.68)•U(0 . 3'l ) 
0.13 0.11 
-0.00) 0.15 ·0.0) 
0.97 
137 137 1l7 
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TABLE VI 
DETERMINANTS OF THE RATE OF CHANGE OF TOTAL COMPENSATION 
1972-1973 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Constant 
Unemployment (1972) 
% Change in Man. Wage 
(1972-73) 
% Change in Const. Act. 
(1972-73) 
Expectation of Public 
Sector Share (1972-79) 
% Change in Public Sector 
Share (1972-73) 
Degree of Unionization 
Relative Strike Frequency 
(1972) 
1971 
Right-to-Work Law 
Coordinated Bargaining 
New England 
Middle Atlantic 
East North Central 
West North Central 
East South Central 
West South Central 
Mountain 
Pacific 
ALL CRAFTS 
(t-Statistics in Parentheses) 
COEFFICIENT 
0.082 
-0.001 
(3.06)*** 
-0.004 
(0.05) 
0.004 
(1. 23) 
-0.001 
(0.04) 
-0.000 
(0.04) 
-0.007 
(0.90) 
-0.001 
(0.52) 
0.007 
(2.01)** 
-0.002 
(0.86) 
0.015 
(3.37)*** 
0.000 
(0.04) 
-0.012 
(2.63)*** 
-0.009 
(2.07)** 
-0.007 
(1.19) 
0.016 
(3.89)*** 
0.015 
(2.32)*** 
0.012 
(2.37)*** 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Bricklayers 
Carpenters 
Cement Masons 
Crane Operators 
Electricians 
Iron Workers 
Laborers 
Painters 
Pipefitters 
Plasterers 
Plumbers 
Roofers 
Sheet Metal Workers 
Teamsters 
n of observations 
COEFFICIENT 
-0.006 
(0.79) 
0.007 
(0. 93) 
Omitted 
0.005 
(0.58) 
0.004 
(0.52) 
0.006 
(0.76) 
0.004 
(0. 46) 
0.001 
(0.19) 
-0.007 
(0.91) 
-0.002 
(0.31) 
-0.007 
(0.94) 
-0.005 
(0.59) 
0.001 
(0.15) 
0.000 
(0.00) 
0.11 
0.09 
7.19 
1860 
*Signif. at .10 level; ** signif. at .05 level; ***signif. at .01 level. 
~ 
. I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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TABLE VII 
DETERMINANTS OF THE RATE OF CHANGE OF TOTAL COMPENSATION 
1973-1974 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Constant 
Unemployment (1973) 
% Change in Man. Wage 
(1973-74) . 
% Change in Const. Act. 
(1973-74) . 
Expectation of Public 
Sector Share (1972-79) 
% Change in Public Sector 
Share (1973-74) 
Degree of Unionization 
Relative Strike Frequency 
(1973) 
1971 
Right-to-Work Law 
Coordinated Bargaining 
New .England 
Middle Atlantic 
East North Central 
West North Central 
East South Central 
West South Central 
Mountain 
Pacific 
ALL CRAFTS 
(t-Statistics in Parentheses) 
COEFFICIENT 
0.056 
-0.000 
(0.45) 
-0.014 
(0.25) 
0.000 
(0.06) 
0.022 
(1. 27) 
-0.001 
(0.49) 
-0.018 
(2 .17) ** 
0.004 
(1.02) 
0.004 
(1.03) 
-0.005 
(1. 93) * 
0.001 . 
(0.21) 
0.004 
(0.94) 
0.012 
(2.35)** 
0.019 
(3.65)*** 
0.025 
(3. 77) 
0.014 
(2.94)*** 
0.030 
(4.21)*** 
0.040 
(6.42) *** 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Bricklayers 
Carpenters 
Cement Masons 
Crane Operators 
Electricians 
Iron Workers 
Laborers 
Painters 
Pipefitters 
Plasterers 
Plumbers 
Roofers 
Sheet Metal Workers 
Teamsters 
n of observations 
*Signif. at .10 level; **signif. at .05 level; ***signif. at .01 level. 
COEFFICIENT 
0.012 
(1.35) 
0.014 
(1.52) 
Omitted 
0.016 
(1. 79) * 
0.014 
(1.53) 
0.015 
(1.66)* 
0.021 
(2.32)** 
0.016 
(1.75)* 
0.025 
(2. 71)* 
0.019 
(2.05)** 
0.024 
(2.64)*** 
0.019 
(2.14)** 
0.025 
(2.72)*** 
0.018 
(1. 98)** 
0.08 
0.06 
5.00 
1861 
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TABLE VIII 
DETERMINANTS OF THE RATE OF CHANGE OF TOTAL COMPENSATION 
1976-1977 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Constant 
Unemployment (1976) 
% Change in Man, Wage 
(1976-77) 
% Change in Const, Act. 
. (1976-77) 
Expectation of Public 
Sector Share (1972-79) 
% Change in Public Sector 
Share (1976-77) 
Degree of Unionization 
Relative Strike Frequency 
(1976) 
1971 
Right-to-Work Law 
Coordinated Bargaining 
N~w England 
Middle Atlantic 
East North Central 
West North Central 
East South Central 
West South Central 
Mountain 
Pacific 
ALL CRAFTS 
(t-Statistics in Parentheses) 
COEFFICIENT 
0.043 
-0.003 
(3.92)"'** 
0.217 
(3.33)"'"'"' 
0.001 
(1.00) 
0.036 
(1.82)"' 
0,002 
(2.41)"'"' 
-0.000 
(0.04) 
-0.002 
(0. 7 5) 
o.ooo 
(0.00) 
0.003 
(0. 85) 
-0.008 
(1.38)) 
-0.009 
(1.65)* 
-0.002 
(0,41) 
-0.001 
(0. 23) 
-0.001 
(0.19) 
0.025 
(4.67)*** 
0.012 
(1.45) 
0.032 
(4.57)*** 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Bricklayers 
Carpenters 
Cement Mauons 
Crane Opera tors 
Electricians 
Iron Workers 
Laborers 
Painters 
Pipefitters 
Plasteren 
Plumbers 
Roofers 
Sheet Metal Workers 
Teamsters 
n of observations 
*Signif. at .10 level; **signif. at .05 level; ""'*signif .• at .01 level. 
COEFFICIENT 
o.oos 
(0.46) 
0.018 
(1.66)* 
Omitted 
0.011 
(1.06) 
0.027 
(2.51)"* 
0.026 
(2.49)** 
0.01!1 
(1.43) 
0.014 
(1. 31) 
0.018 
(1.48) 
0.009 
(0.88) 
0.021 
(2.00)*;11 
0.015 
(1.38) 
0.008 
(0. 80) 
0.003 
(0.25) 
0.10 
0.08 
6.43 
1808 
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TABLE IX 
DETERMINANTS OF THE RATE OF CHANGE OF TOTAL COMPENSATION 
ALL CRAFTS BUT PLUMBERS 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Constant 
Unemployment (1976) 
% Change in Man. Wage 
(1976-77) 
% Change in Const. Act. 
(1976-77) 
Expectation of Public 
Sector Share (1972-79) 
% Change in Public Sector 
Share (1976-77) 
Degree of Unionization 
Relative Strike Frequency 
(1976) 
1971 
Right-to-Work Law 
Coordinated Bargaining 
New England 
Middle Atlantic 
East North Central 
West North Central 
East South Central 
West South Central 
Mountain 
Pacific 
% Change in Plumbers Wage 
(1976-77) 
1976-1977 
(t-Statistics in Parentheses) 
COEFFICIENT 
0.040 
-0.002 
(2.71)** 
0.189 
(2.82)*** 
-0.001 
(1.41) 
0.039 
(1. 92) * 
0.002 
(2.35)** 
-0.006 
(0.61) 
-0.001 
(0.41) 
-0.004 
(0.83) 
-0.000 
(0.00) 
-0.015 
(2.39)** 
-0.011 
(2.02)** 
-0.001 
(0.21) 
0.002 
(0.27) 
-0.001 
(0.14) 
0.029 
(5 .33)*** 
0.013 
(1.59) 
0.029 
(4.03) *** 
0.096 
(4.0l)**fr 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Bricklayers 
Carpenters 
Cement Masons 
Crane Operators 
Electricians 
Iron Workers 
Laborers 
Painters 
Pipefitters 
Plasterers 
Plumbers 
Roofers 
Sheet Metal Workers 
Teamsters 
n of observations 
COEFFICIENT 
0.004 
(0.34) 
0.016 
(1.56) 
Omitted 
0.010 
(0. 75) 
0.025 
(2.42)** 
0.025 
(2.39)** 
0.139 
(1. 32) 
0.013 
(1. 20) 
0.017 
(1.57) 
0.008 
(0.75) 
Omitted 
0.013 
(1. 23) 
0.007 
(0. 69) 
0.001 
(0.13) 
0.11 
0.10 
7.06*** 
1672 
*Signif. at .10 level; ** signif. at .05 level; ***signif. at .01 level. 
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CHAPTER IV 
The Union-Nonunion Wage Interaction in Construction 
During the decade of the 1970's nonunion construction activity grew 
rapidly both absolutely and relatively. Bourdon and Levitt write that 
"increases in union hourly rates in the late 1960's, driven by the high 
volume of construction demand, were a major cause of subsequent open 
shop growth" (p. 5). The causation, which they imply is consistent with 
microeconomic theory, is that as the cost of one factor of production, 
union labor, increases contractors have a greater incentive to substi-
tute other factors of production, nonunion labor, for it. 
If microeconomic theory's prediction is correct one ought to see 
either the proportion of work done by nonunion workers increase or else 
see unions reduce their negotiated wage .increases in order to maintain 
their share of the market. Microeconomic theory, however, is not the 
only relevant theory. 
In his work "The Balkanization of Labor Markets" Clark Kerr writes: 
Extensive discussions with craft union leaders and the em-
ployers dealing with them in the San Francisco Bay area indi-
cate that these unions do not generally use their control over 
the supply . of labor to force up wage rates. They employ it 
rather to adjust suppiy to demand once the wage rate is fixed. 
If the supply fall too short of demand, the employers are en-
couraged to introduce machinery or look to another craft for 
workers or even to nonunion men. 
Kerr's widely quoted balkanization hypothesis developed from his 
contact with the construction industry suggests that union leaders are 
more interested in achieving a wage target than in having all union mem-
bers employed or .in maintaining their market share. Carried to its logi-
cal extreme this would imply that the market has absolutely no effect 
on union wage demands. Given that the necessary precondition of being 
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a union leader is to have followers, wage demands must certainly be tern-
peted when the union's survival is threatened. 
The most prolific writer on industrial relations in construction, 
D. Quinn Mills, has recently expressed doubt that construction union 
wage settlements have been tempered by economic realities: 
It would be too much to conclude that the inflationary prob-
lem in construction collective bargaining has disappeared. 
The recent levels of settlements nationally, while acclaimed 
as "moderate" by many economists, should be viewed in con-
text. Settlements averaging 7 percent in an environment of 
massive unemployment do not augur well for the future, when 
the volume of construction activity accelerates. (p. 80) 
Mills' implication is that Clark Kerr was correct, i.e., construction 
union wage demands are set without regard for their impact on union mem-
ber employment. 
Have the business and popular press articles which have period!-
cally reported negotiated wage reductions in construction been published 
because they were man-bites-dog curiosities? Is the growing nonunion 
sector having an impact on union wage demands? It has been impossible 
to answer this question largely because systematically collected data on 
the size and pay of the nonunion construction sector has been unavail-
able. In 1972, howeve'r, the Bureau of Labor Statistics began including 
the construction industry in their Industry Wage Survey Program. Such 
surveys have since been conducted in 1972, 1973, 1976 and 1977. While 
the cities and crafts surveyed have varied across the survey, there is 
now a set of union and nonunion data available on which to test the mi-
croeconomic theory hypothesis vs. the balkanization hypothesis. 
Before proceeding with such tests, a major note of caution is in . 
order. The Bureau of Labor Statistics collects data on union and non-
union ·craftsmen for the following crafts: bricklayer, cement mason, 
, 
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carpenter, electrician, ironworker, laborer, painter, pipefitter, 
plumber, roofer and sheet metal worker. Bourdon and Levitt have clearly 
demonstrated that these labels connote different skills and skill levels 
in the union and nonunion sectors (pp. 57-78). A nonunion sheet metal 
worker may occasionally do work completely out of his craft such as 
carpentry, while a union electrician almost never does nonelectrical 
work. A union journeyman electrician is likely to be skilled in the 
full set of wiring tasks on a job while the nonunion electrician may be 
skilled in a narrow range of tasks. Furthermore, the kinds of tasks 
that a nonunion carpenter performs may vary greatly from city to city. 
The Bureau of Labor Statistics has followed their normal procedure 
' of standardizing these craft classifications from city to city. Their 
efforts cannot begin to approximate the standardization of craft defi-
nitions that has arisen out of decades of craft union jurisdictional 
dispute settlement. Hence, part of what on the surface appears to be 
union-nonunion wage difference may in fact reflect differing prices for .. 
differing services. 
Likewise there is great reason to suspect that productivity differ-
ences exist between union and nonunion craftsmen. Such productivity 
differences could arise from variations in workman age, experience, and 
training or from the characteristics of the firms which employ the 
workers such as supervision, mechanization and work organization. Un-
fortunately only one empirical study has been done on these productivity 
variations, a case study by Allan Mandelstamm in 1965. Mandelstamm 
found union craftsmen to be the more productive. At this time there is 
no basis for generalization about the relative productivity question. 
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Considerable caution must be exercised in using the B.L.S. gen-
erated construction wage data. The relative wage differentials it 
reports may reflect much more than the presence or absence of unioniza-
tion. With that caution we will proceed to review the one previous 
study which is relevant and to specify and test our own model. 
Prior Work 
Sobotka (p. 73, 1952) and Shulenburger (p. 118, 1974 and p. 404, 
1978) have earlier used the proportion of craftsmen organized to account 
for variation in union wages. Sobotka found the ratio of union wages in 
six crafts to laborer wages to be positively related to the proportion 
of the. craft organization. He failed, however, to take any of the cor-
relates of unionization which might have affected the wage ratio into 
account in his study. Shulenburger's dependent variable was the change 
in negotiated construction union wages. In a statistically controlled 
study he found neither the proportion of a craft organized nor the 
change in the craft's membership to be consistently significantly re-
lated to wage change. His measure of unionization was derived from 
union reported membership statistics generated through Landrum-Griffin 
reporting requirements. There is considerable reason to believe that 
these statistics are not accurate reflections of union membership. Even 
wer~ the statistics accurate, his formulation of the variable, i.e., 
reported .union membership divided by total construction employment in 
the city implicitly assumes that 100% of all union craftsmen were em-
ployed. This is highly unlikely. His estimate of the unionization 
wage relationship is thus only a very rough approximation of the true 
relationship. 
. 40 
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Stephen Welch (1980) published the first and only study to use the 
new BLS data to test the impact of union organization on the differen-
tial between union and nonunion construction wages. The model which is 
tested is: 
Equation 1: 
+ ••• 
where lnWij is the natural log of the ratio of union to nonunion 
wages; 
U is the ratio of unionized to total union and nonunion 
craftsmen employed; 
T is a dummy variable for the trade; 
and C is a dummy variable for the city. 
He used only 90 of the observations available from the 1973 BLS survey • 
These observations included six crafts in fifteen cities. His study ex-
eludes four crafts for which data were reported. Table 1 below repro-
duces his equation as estimated. 
His results with their highly significant coefficients on unioniza-
tion, clearly show the proportion of workers organized to be directly re-
lated to the log of the union nonunion wage ratio. Taking the partial 
of his dependent variable with respect to unionization, setting it equal 
to zero, and solving for U shows that the maximum wage ratio is achieved 
when 65.68% of the craft is organized. Given the nonlinear form uti-
lized unionization rates greater or less than 65.68% would result in 
lower union-nonunion wage ratios. 
Welch's study suffers from two flaws, data inadequacy and model mis-
specification. The data inadequacy occurs because the BLS survey deals 
with wages of employed workers and not compensation. As Welch points out 
I 
I 
;. ',. 
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TABLE 1 
Regression Results: Union-Nonunion Wage Ratio on Extent of 
Trade Union Organization and Selected Dummy 
Variables (N • 90) 
Variables Estimated Coefficients 
Constant 
u2 
u 
T2 
T3 
T4 
T5 (sheet metal) 
T6 (laborers) 
C2U 
C3U 
- C4U 
C5U 
C6U 
C7U 
cau 
C9U (Miami) 
ClOU. 
C11U 
Cl2U 
Cl3U 
Cl4U (Denver) 
Cl5U 
. ...,2 
R • 0.3653 
S.E.E. • 0.15244 
F • 1.92** 
*Significant at the .10 level 
**Significant at the .05 level 
0.00962 
1.15420 
-0.87755 
0.06647 
0.06550 
0.00495 
0.12463 
0.11329 
0.02266 
0.06495 
0.01161 
0.04150 
0.13785 
0.04104 
0.03116 
-0.15626 
-0.06185 
-0.05317 
0.05892 
-0.12718 
-0.15700 
-0.10796 
t-Statistics 
0.069 
2.293** 
-2.107** 
1.141 
1.131 
0.084 
2.185** 
2.031** 
0~273 
0.760 . 
0.122 
0.506 
0.818 
0.344 
'"0.256 
-1.935* 
-0.383 
-0.501 
0.612 
-1.246 
-1.957* 
-1.066 
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(page 156), prior research has shown that construction fringe benefits 
rise with negotiated wages (Gustman and Segal, 1972) and that nonunion 
wage supplements are smaller than union supplements (Northrup and Foster, 
1975). Given this problem (which cannot be corrected with the available 
data) the peak union-nonunion wage ratio point cannot accurately be 
calculated. In addition, the BLS data report only employed craftsmen. 
Ideally, the unionization ratio would be calculated as total construc-
tion union members divided by total construction craftsmen. The use of 
"employed" rather than "total" carries with it the implication that 
equal proportions of union and nonunion craftsmen are unemployed. No 
tests of this implication are available. 
The misspecification problem is serious. Several factors which 
might affect the wage ratio are not included in his model. These in-
clude institutional, demand, and supply -factors which might have impacts 
on the wage ratio but which are independent of the level of unionization. 
Failure to include them runs the risk of attributing their impact to the 
unionization variable or other of his variables, which might be corre-
lated with them. In the section below we more completely specify the 
model and estimate it over all four time periods for which data is now 
available. 
-Model Specification 
Welch's basic model which permits a linear or curvilinear relation-
ship with unionization to emerge from the data accommodates existing 
theory well. We expand the basic Welch model to Equation 2 below. 
~- Equation 2: 
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2 
lnWij = c0 + c1uij + c2uij + c3vj 
+ c4Rj + c5Mij + c6Bij + c7c + ••• + 
lnW--natural log of union • nonunion craft wages 
u--percent unionized 
V--percent change in the volume of construction ac-
tivity since the previous year 
R--general unemployment rate 
M-~average manufacturing wages divided by craft wages 
B--dummy variable for coordinated bargaining participa-
tion 
c--craft union dummy variables. 
Our model modifies Welch's by explicitly including d~mand, supply, 
and institutional forces which are hypothesized to affect the union-
nonunion wage ratio. Welch's model used city dummy variables as a com-
posite proxy for all of these three effects. This masks the effects 
and is unnecessary as the effects can be measured directly. 
Research has consistently found union membership and bargaining 
power to be consistently positively related to demand. Thus the empiri-
cal work suggests that demand is directly related to the size of the 
union nonunion wage differential. Strong demand should increase union 
more than nonunion wages through the increased bargaining power route. 
We measure changes in demand here by the percentage change in the total 
volume of construction activity. As before, the F. W. Dodge measure of 
such activity is utilized. This variable is omitted in the 1972 regres-
sion as 1971 F. W. Dodge data are unavailable. 
Supply is measured by the city's unemployment rate. This, of course, 
reflects the volume of labor available for construction. As such it bet-
ter reflects the quality of labor available to the nonunion sector where 
; 
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only skill barriers to entry exist. Thus as the unemployment rate in-
creases nonunion construction wages should be suppressed and the differ-
ential between union and nonunion wages wider. 
Roger Bowlby (1980) found that construction workers earn a substan-
tial portion of their annual incomes from nonconstruction activity. In-
deed 37 percent of construction workers' nonconstruction annual incomes 
is derived from work in the manufacturing sector alone. This sector is 
nearly twice as large a source of construction worker earnings than any 
other nonconstruction sector. When deciding whether to work in the manu-
facturing sector or construction sector the relative wages of the two 
sectors must be an important consideration. We include the ratio be-
tween a specific craft's negotiated wages and the manufacturing wage 
rate as an independent variable to capture this effect. Since most con-
struction workers who come out of manufacturing probably go into the 
nonunion construction sector, that sector and the nonunion sector are 
part of the same labor market. Thus nonunion construction wages must 
be set just high enough to make construction a better alternative for 
workers than manufacturing. 
, This line of argument sugg~sts that nonunion construction wages are 
established jointly with manufacturing wages. We thus expect this vari-
able to be inversely related to our formulation of the dependent vari-
able, i.e., the better the unionized craft performs relative to the manu-
facturing sector the greater the disparity between union and nonunion 
construction wages. 
The dummy variable for coordinated bargaining reflects this insti-
tutional arrangement. One presumes that both unions and contractors 
agree to this arrangement in the belief that it is in their self 
I 
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interest to do so. We include the variable control for this arrangement 
but adopt no specific hypothesis about its impact on our dependent 
variable. 
Finally craft dummy variables are included in the equation. These 
variables capture craft -specific institutional factors. Some crafts 
bargain more frequently, have wider labor markets, are leaders, etc.; 
these factors would have an independent impact on the dependent variable. 
Proportion unionized and proportion unionized squared are formulated 
as Welch formulated them. Should a significant positive coefficient be 
estimated for the unionization variable support will exist for the micro-
economic, competing factor argument. Should the coefficient on the 
unionization variable be insignificant, the balkanization "hypothesis 
will be supported. 
The most consistent set of crafts and cities were sampled in 1973 
and 1977. This enables us to examine the impact that the change in 
unionization had on the wage ratio. The 1977 equation includes this 
variable, percent change in unionization since 1973, as an additional 
independent variable. A significant positive coefficient would support 
microeconomic theory, while an insignificant sign would support balkan-
ization. 
Time Periods and Sample 
We will estimate the equation for each of the four time periods, 
1972, 1973, 1976, and 1977 which the B.L.S. has surveyed to date and 
will include every craft surveyed. The set of cities differ across 
years and crafts differ across years and within time periods. Our four 
equations will therefore vary in the number of observations across pe-
riods and the number of craft dummy variables included. 
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The assortment of years in which surveys were made gives us an op-
portunity to analyze the effects of wage controls on the wage ratio; 
1972 and 1973 were control years while 1976 and 1977 were not. We hy-
pothesize that a smaller amount of the variations in the dependent vari-
able will be accounted for during the controls years. This is consistent 
with the announced control period intention to reestablish traditional 
relationships. 
Discussion of Findings 
Table 2 lists the regressions as estimated. The regressions clearly 
support the balkanization thesis. In no case is there a significant co-
efficient on the unionization squared variable or the percent change of 
unionized variable. The only significant coefficient on the unionization 
variable is in the 1977 regression and that coefficient is of the wrong 
sign. Simply stated, the evidence presented here is inconsistent with 
the thesis that the level, or changes in the level, of unionization have 
an impact on the ratio of union to nonunion wages. in construction. 
More complete specification of the model illustrates that Welch's 
finding of a significant relationship was a result of omission of impor-
tant variables. This finding was foreshadowed by Welch's experimenta-
tion with his own model. The first model he reported which included only 
2 2 U and U had coefficients on U and U which were significant at the .01 
level. When he added city and craft dummy variables the significance 
level on the union variable coefficients dropped to the .OS level. 
It is unlikely that the lack of significance of unionization is due 
to a limited range problem. The mean percentage unionized in 1977 for 
the sample was 68.4%, with observations ranging from 4.7% to 99.6%. 
Similarly, the mean percent change in unionization from 1973 until 1977 
r 
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TABLE 2 
Dependent Variable: Natural Log of Union Nonunion Craft Wage ... 
Year 
;; Variable 1972 1973 1976 1977 
i Coordinated Bargaining -.070 -.045 .036 -.027 
I (1.47) (.04) (.54) (.58) I 
i % Unionized .544 .339 .210 -.501 I. 
I (. 73) (.65) (.55) (1.67)* 
I 2 .092 I (% Unionized) -.654 -.357 -.389 
I 
. (1.10) (. 84) (1.12) (.39) 
1973-1977 % Change .051 
in Unionized (.82) 
Manufacturing Wage Ratio .209 -.568 -1.055 -.021 
(.59) (2.20)** (5.03)*** (.089) 
Percent Change in Volume .232 .072 .133 
of Construction (2.53)** (1. 23) (1.78)* 
Unemployment .015 -.005 -.016 .037 
(. 94) (.36) (1.10) (2.014)** 
Bricklayers -.301 -.242 -.02-4 -.157 
(2.042)*** (3.24)*** (. 23) (2.02)** 
Cement Masons -.35 .078 .136 .018 
( .46) (1. 23) (1.56) (2.58)** 
~ 
Electricians .35 .073 .172 .105 
( . 50) (1. 27) (2.25)** (1.91)* 
Iron Workers .254 
(2.14)** 
Laborers -.076 • 228 .396 .007 
( .80) (3.16)*** (6.18)*** (1.91)* 
Painters .198 
(2.87)** 
Pipefitters .052 .064 -.062 .016 
(.57) (. 6 7) (. 77) (.10) 
Plumbers -.050 .032 -.029 .065 
(. 64) (.54) (.41) (.29) 
Roofers .054 .038 -.001 -.012 
( .36) (. 64) ( .00) (1.11) 
Sheet Metal Workers .043 .167 .066 .119 
( .47) (2.88)*** (.07) (2.15)** 
Constant .216 .642 .909 .295 
-2 R .18 .31 .76 .42 
F 1.83* 3.84*** 6.96*** 3.68*** 
~ ' N 48 98 30 64 
t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*Significant at .10 level. 
**Significant at .05 level. 
***Significant at .01 level. 
, 
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· was -5.2% with a range of from 92.9% decrease to a 116.4% increase. 
Unionization on average in 1973 was 63.2%. 
The large statistically significant negative coefficient on unioni-
zation in 1977 is hard to explain. Taken literally it implies that the 
union-nonunion wage ratio was 50.1% smaller when 100% of the workforce 
was organized. Given the significanc~ of only 10%, the small sample, 
and the lack of theory to support the sign, one is tempted to treat the 
coefficient as a statistical aberation. It does, however, fit into a 
pattern. For the years 1972, 1973, 1976 and 1977 the coefficients on 
percent unionized are .544, .339, .210; and -.501, respectively. Ad-
mittedly, the first three coefficients are not significant at tradi-
tional levels. The pattern of continual decrease might suggest that the 
best organized locals either moderated wage demands for competitive rea-
sons or that nonunion contractors in their labor markets were willing to 
pay nearly union wages to get workers to work nonunion. We see this 
pattern as very weak evidence of a movement back toward an equilibrium. 
In 1973 and again in 1976 the manufacturing wage ratio took on a 
statistically significant negative sign. In the other two years the co-
efficients were statistically insignificant. This finding is consistent 
with the argument that nonunion construction wages and manufacturing 
wages are set in the same labor market. 
In all three years for which change in construction volume data was 
available a positive coefficient was estimated. In 1973 and 1977 the 
coefficient was statistically significant. Construction unions are ap-
parently able to convert increased demand into a wider wage margin over 
nonunion workers. 
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The labor supply variable, unemployment, had the expected signifi-
cant positive sign only in 1977. An insignificant coefficient was es-
timated for the other two periods. General labor supply looseness thus 
contributes to the union sector's differential, but the one out of four 
time periods for which this happens makes the empirical association quite 
tenuous. 
' In no case did coordinated bargaining have a significant impact on 
the wage ratio. Perhaps there is no practical significance to formal 
coordination. The communications network of craft unions may well ac-
complish the same end as does formal coordination. 
The craft pattern is quite mixed. The bricklayer coefficient is 
significant three times, positive in 1972 and negative in 1973 and 1977. 
This may only reflect a repetitive two-year bargaining pattern. 
During the wage control years 1972 and 1973, 18% and 31% of the 
variation in the dependent variables were accounted for. In the post-
controls years, 1976 and 1977, 76% and 75% of the variation were ex-
plained. The controls were intended to replace market and institutional 
forces with "order." They apparently succeeded. No other major pattern 
of variation is apparent in the independent variables' coefficients 
across the controls-market era. 
Discussion 
The very limited set of data available support the balkanization 
notion. Craft unions do not appear to respond to loss of market by re-
ducing their wage premium over unorganized workers. This finding is 
bolstered by the apparent interaction of manufacturing and nonunion craft 
wages. Craft unions can apparently tolerate even high general 
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unemployment without lowering thebarriers around their wages. Their 
bargaining power rises and falls with construction demand in a manner 
which is consistently reflected in their relative wage advantage. 
Even though our results are consistent across time, we choose not 
to generalize to other time periods or to all crafts within the same 
time periods. The l~rgest set of observations in any of our regressions 
was 98. This ' is a very small fraction of the total universe and was not 
randomly selected by the B.L.S. from the universe. 
I 
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CHAPTER V 
Discussion 
Wage determination in construction in the 1970's has been examined 
to the extent permitted by the data. Our findings certainly confirm the 
suspicion that the wage setting relationship here is more complex than 
that in the remainder of the economy. Below we summarize our separate 
findings and apply them to an evaluation of the wage control program. 
Demand 
Demand, as measured in this study and in Shulenburger (1974), is 
seldom significantly related to wage change in the organized sector. 
Shulenburger resorts to using housing starts as a proxy for the total 
volume of building construction activity. The failure to find signifi-
cance there is at least partially related to the weakness of the proxy. 
Such ,is not the case in the current study; no proxy is used. For 
perhaps the first time, researchers were able to use the F. W. Dodge Di-
vision of McGraw-Hill, Inc. construction volume data. Neither _the to-
tal volume measure nor the craft specific volume submeasures are sig-
nificantly related to wage change. 
This finding is consistent with an extreme balkanization thesis, 
i.e., craft unions blindly set and bargain successfully for wage tar-
gets. No concern is shown for membership employment in setting tar-
gets, and union contractors fail to interject volume considerations into 
the wages fixed at the bargaining table. Is construction demand so 
I 
price inelastic that the level of wages is unrelated to the strength of 
demand? 
. 
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We are not yet convinced that this is the case. We hesitate be-
cause the F. W. Dodge volume figures do not translate directly into men 
and women on the job. The lead time from award announcement to work 
initiation and work completion is highly variable by craft involved and 
by city, and, probably, over time also. The number of manhours that a 
given dollar volume project will translate into also varies along the 
same dimensions. The lack of one-to-one temporal, spatial and craft 
tracking of the volume/manhours relationship could result in a failure 
of the variable to be statistically significant, even if wage change is 
related strongly to demand. 
Alas, the Dodge figures are the best currently available for use as 
a proxy ~or manhours demand. DOL's Office of Construction Services is 
in the early stages of exactly specifying the dollar-volume/manhours 
relationship for public projects in five cities. Perhaps this project 
in time will provide a data base which will permit a definitive test of 
the relationship between demand variation and wage change in construe-
tion. 
Supply 
Excess labor supply as measured by the unemployment rate consist-
ently impacts on union wages as was predicted. For 1977 the coefficient 
in the intercraft model suggests that a one percentage point increase in 
employment would reduce the change in negotiated wages by three-tenths 
of a percentage point. A ten percent general unemployment rate would 
reduce negotiated wage change by three percentage points. In the indi-
vidual craft regressions the coefficient is significant and negative for 
eight of the fourteen crafts. Labor supply changes apparently have the 
effect predicted by micro-economic theory. 
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In the union-nonunion wage ratio study the unemployment rate has a 
significant positive coefficient in one of the four time periods. In 
the ot!ler periods its coefficient is insignificant. This significance 
in the post-control period indicates that unemployment has the stronger 
wage depressing impact on nonunion wages. 
Nonmarket Forces 
Contour-type explanations of wage change are included in our models. 
The negotiated wage change models for 1976-77 use plumbers' wage change 
as an independent variable. We find that plumbers' wage change is sig-
nificantly related to wage change for all crafts in the overall equation 
and for five subcontractor crafts in the craft equations. This, coupled 
with some statistical evidence that plumbers' wages are no~ simply a 
composite of unspecified forces, leads us to believe that the plumbers 
may have some status as a key craft. We cannot reject the hypothesis 
that imitative behavior is important in wage setting in construction. 
Strong evidence that something in addition to market forces drives 
construction wages appears in the union-nonunion wage study. There the 
union-nonunion wage ratio is unaffected by the widespread declines in 
unionization. When organizations experiencing threats to their survival 
do not compromise, the balkanization thesis is more palatable. 
Wage Control 
Wage control effects appear in several instances in our work. In 
the organized sector's wage equations the 1972-73 control year equation 
is an apparent anomaly; none of the craft coefficients have significant 
signs. This contrasts sharply with later years. This lack of craft 
dummy significance is consistent with a wage control process which treats 
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all crafts alike. It is also not consistent with Mills' (1980) view of 
the wage control effort which " ••• so laboriously straightened out in 
the period 1971-74 ••• " the structure of compensation in construction 
(p. 86). 
The 1973-74 regression, covering the last of the wage control pe-
riod, does have several significant craft coefficients. Among those 
significant coefficients are large positive coefficients for plumbers, 
pipefitters, iron workers, and sheet metal workers. These crafts are 
among the highest ranked of all crafts in total compensation. A posi-
tive increment of 2.5 percentage points for plumbers and pipefitters 
relative to carpenters, the base craft, does not appear consistent with 
"straightening out" the structure of compensation. 
As judged by the coefficient on the labor supply variable, unem-
ployment, the wage control period did disrupt the operation of the la-
bor market. For 1976-77, eight of the individual craft regressions have 
the expected, significant negative sign on unemployment, i.e., loose la-
bor markets depress wage change. For 1972-73 and 1973-74 there are only 
four significant coefficients in total. Similarly, the overall regres-
sion for 1976-77 has a highly significant negative coefficient on unem-
ployment while the 1972-1973 regression has a significant negative co-
efficient which is one-third the size of the 1976-77 coefficient. the 
1973-74 regression has an insignificant coefficient on unemployment. 
Thus, during the period of controls, the one market force which consist-
ent1y held wages in check, unemployment, was nearly ineffective. 
Common practice would be to substitute the mean values of the inde-
pendent variables for 1972-73 and 1973-74 into the 1976-77 equation to 
obtain an estimate of what wage increases would have been had controls 
. l 
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not existed. We chose not to do this because of the low predictive 
value (R2 • .08) of our 1976-77 regression. Since this regression pre-
diets wages for its own time period so poorly, it is unrealistic to be-
lieve it can provide useful subjunctive information about the controls 
period. 
From the union-nonunion wage ratio study further evidence that the 
controls altered market forces emerges. Only 'four craft dummies are 
statistically significant for the 1972 and 1973 time period, while nine 
coefficients are significant for 1976 and 1977. This is consistent with 
the 1972-73 negotiated wage regression in which no individual craft ef-
fects emerge. Wage control in the early period apparently flattened the 
, 
dispersion of wage change. 
The. total explanatory power of the wage ratio regressions also 
varies across the control-noncontrol period. For the four years, 1972, 
1973, 1976, and 1977, the adjusted R2's are .18, .31, .76, and .42, re-
spectively. During the controls only about one-half as much variance 
can be accounted for as in the post-control period. 
Because of the higher explanatory power of the post-controls re-
gressiort_ we are able to estimate the impact of controls on the union-
rtonunion wage ratio. We do so by substituting the mean values from 1972 
and 1973 into the 1977 regression equation. We chose the 1977 equation 
for this purpose because it was estimated with more than twice as many 
degrees of freedom as the 1976 equation. The results are given in the 
table below. 
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Impact of Controls 
Predicted Wage Actual Wage Percent 
Year Ratio Ratio Difference 
1977 1.409 1.419 + • 7% 
1972 1.282 1.489 +16.7% 
1973 1.195 1.445 +17.3% 
As can be seen from the table, the 1977 equation fits that year's 
data extremely well. For 1972 and 1973 wage controls increase the union-
nonunion wage advantage by about 17%. Controls thus appear to have been 
perversely effective in increasing controlled craft union wage increase 
relative to uncontrolled and wage board controlled craft nonunion wages. 
The size of this perverse impact is quite large. In~rder to check 
it we utilize the 1972 and 1973 equations to predict the 1977 wage ratio. 
The 1972 equation predicts that the 1977 wage ratio would have been 10.2% 
greater had controls existed in 1977, while the 1973 equation predicts a 
17.7% higher ratio. 
Each of the equations thus tells the same story; controls served 
to increase the union-nonunion wage advantage. There are at least 
three possible explanations for this: 1) controls really did benefit 
union craft workers more than nonunion craft workers, 2) structural 
changes occurred between the controls period and 1977 which the model 
did ·not capture, and 3) the relatively small samples are not representa-
tive of the whole. In evaluating these options one should recall that 
our model includes the most prominent structural change, the reduction 
in unionization. We simply cannot evaluate option three until a wider 
selection of data is made available. 
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Data Limitations 
Although only twenty-one years of consistent construction industry 
wage data now exist, some interesting insights could probably be gained 
through longitudinal modeling of the data. Prediction of the future 
fromcross sectional estimation is risky as witnessed by the near futile 
attempts to develop macroeconomic models from such studies. We are un-
able to develop such models because construction demand data is avail-
able cinly for 1972-1980. 
The F. W. Dodge Division of McGraw-Hall, Inc. provided the 1972-80 
· demand data which we utilized here. Such data are available from F. W. 
Dodge for the 1960-72 period. We were financially unable to purchase 
the data. Its approximate $100,000 price may always keep ; it beyond the 
reach of researchers. 
Another limitation of this study is the method of including strike 
activity in the models. We simply use the city wide, all industry 
strike data which B.L.S. publishes for SMSA's as a proxy for the labor 
relations climate of the city. It would obviously be better to include 
measures of the existence and magnitude of specific construction craft 
strikes in the craft specific models. Overall craft strike measures 
should be used in aggregate models. We did not use such strike measures 
because the data was unavailable to us. The Bureau of Labor Statistics 
compiles such disaggregate data but would not release it to us for rea-
sons of confidentiality. While understanding the position of B.L.S• 
concerning certain court decisions, we do not understand why data on 
such clearly public events as strikes need to be collected under a 
promise of confidentiality. The B.L.S. has a rich set of data on con-
struction labor relations which it has gone to great expense to collect; 
62 
we trust that they will find a way to make it available to researchers 
in the future. 
Conclusion 
We apologize for the many times we have had to "make do" with 
existing measures. What is needed in order to fully understand wage 
setting in this sector of the economy is a consistent time series of 
supply, demand, and institutional measures dating back to at least 1960. 
The unavailability of craft specific strike data for the entire period, 
of volume data for 1960-1972, and of nonunion wages for all but a few 
crafts and time periods are hurdles that the best statistical imagirta-
tion cannot overcome. 
In spite of these limitations, a picture of construction wage de-
termination is becoming clearer. The market clearly makes a difference, 
but its effects are filtered through a very heavy institutional screen. 
Undoubtedly, extreme market segmentation, balkanization, is too rigid a 
description of the market as is the characterization of the market as a 
bourse. 
Three findings stand out: 1) the variations in the total volume of 
construction activity have little impact on negotiated wages, 2) de-
clines in the proportion of thework force organized ~ave no impact on 
the.ratio of union to nonunion wages, and 3) wage controls disrupt the 
operation of market forces on construction wages and may even have 
operated to increase the union-nonunion wage ratio. Each of these 
findings has been appropriately hedged in the text above. Each of these 
findings deserves further study. 
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